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Abstract 
Over the last decade the process sector has experienced unprecedented process incidents that are 
due to a combination of organizational, technical, and cultural deficiencies. Thus, Process Safety 
Management (PSM) has become a subject of great interest for process companies, governments, 
and professional associations. In fact, many researchers have questioned the effectiveness of 
PSM programs in process companies and discussed the features of a quality PSM program. 
Indeed, a review of the literature reveals several PSM issues in this sector internationally, which 
are mainly about organizational safety culture, maintenance and operational integrity of 
processes, PSM performance measurement, employee training, and knowledge management.    
The purpose of this research is to assess the maturity of PSM at Sonatrach, the Algerian 
public-owned oil and gas company, by evaluating the effectiveness of its PSM program as a part 
of the overall EHS management system through assessment of the key characteristics of a 
functional PSM program at Sonatrach, and how this is indicative of the state of PSM in 
developing countries. Given the results, this work provides recommendations for an appropriate 
path forward for Sonatrach to fully implement and improve PSM beyond adoption of standards. 
An explanatory mixed research approach was selected to investigate the state of PSM programs 
at Sonatrach facilities. It consisted of an online survey administered to a sample of twenty-two 
EHS specialists followed by six interviews with EHS specialists working at different Sonatrach 
facilities.  
The results showed that Sonatrach encounters issues, in addition to the ones mentioned 
above, in the organizational structure of the company, the PSM documentation, human integrity, 
legal compliance, and checking and reviewing of the PSM program performance. This research 
concludes with recommendations that would address these issues in order to establish a robust 
PSM program within Sonatrach facilities and in the process sector in general.       
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Following the catastrophic accident in Bhopal, India on December 3, 1984 and the Piper 
Alpha disaster in the North Sea on July 6, 1988, both of which involved uncontrolled releases of 
dangerous materials, safety in the process industry became a subject of great importance for 
governments and professional organizations. Many countries promulgated regulations in an 
effort to enhance the safety of processes and industrial plants. For example, the European Union 
amended the so-called Seveso I Directive (adopted for the first time in 1976, few months after a 
catastrophic accident in a chemical plant at Seveso, Italy) twice in 1987 and 1988 to include into 
its scope facilities that store dangerous substances (European Commission 2015).  
 In the United States, a report was issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
in 1989 about the Acute Hazardous Events database reported more than 11, 000 events in eight 
years (Mason 2001). As a result, the government adopted Section 112 in the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 which dealt with catastrophic releases. On February 24, 1992, the 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) passed the Process Safety Management 
of Highly Hazardous Chemicals standard (29 CFR 1910.119). This regulation aimed to prevent 
accidental releases of highly hazardous chemicals in the process industry, and to protect 
employees and the nearby community from exposure to those hazards (US OSHA 2000).  
Since the implementation of the PSM of Highly Hazardous Chemicals standard by 
processing companies does not guarantee the safety of processes alone, OSHA recognizes that 
“an effective PSM program requires a systematic approach to evaluating the whole chemical 
process” (OSHA 1994). Indeed, major process accidents did not cease to occur even after the 
requirements of the aforesaid standard became effective (e.g. Sierra Chemical Company accident 
in 1998 at Mustang, NV, Union Carbide Corp. accident in 1999 at Hahville, LA, and First 
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Chemical Corp. explosion at Pascgoula, MS in 2003). Therefore, an agreement in the sector was 
implicitly and gradually formed about the need to go beyond legal compliance with process 
safety regulations to a preventive posture where process incidents are prevented.   
With the emergence of management systems standards in the EHS field by the end of 
1990s, companies in the process industry tended to incorporate some principals and elements of 
those standards such as the Plan- Do- Check- Act approach in PSM in effort to prevent process 
incidents and maintain a continuous improvement in process safety performance. However, the 
sector started to experience unprecedented disasters where organizational, cultural, and technical 
failures contribute simultaneously in the occurrence of incidents. Table 1 summarizes the root 
causes of some process incidents in the oil and gas sector based on the US Chemical Safety 
Investigation Board (CSB) completed investigation reports published online. These mishaps 
happened in the United States over the last decade, and resulted in fire or explosions.  
Accident 
name Nature 
Root causes 
Technical Organizational Cultural 
Giant 
Industries 
Refinery 
explosions & 
fire, 2004 
Uncontrolled 
release of 
pressurized 
Alkylate   
Frequent 
seal-related 
failures in 
the pumps 
due to 
corrosion  
Substandard 
maintenance 
practices, inadequate 
management of 
change on process 
design, ineffective 
LOTO program 
Reactive mindset 
of management; 
Behavioral issues 
of operators 
(safety shortcuts) 
Valero 
Refinery 
Propane Fire, 
2007 
Uncontrolled 
release and 
ignition of 
liquid propane 
from PDA unit 
Uncontrolled 
propane mix 
freezing 
hazard; No 
EIV in place 
Incomplete PSI; 
failures to revise and 
implement PHA; gaps 
in standards and codes 
Operators not 
involved in the 
2006 PHA review 
process 
Tesoro 
Anacortes 
Refinery, 
2010 
Uncontrolled 
release and 
ignition of 
hydrogen and 
naphtha from a 
ruptured heat 
exchanger  
HTHA 
mechanism 
Hazardous non 
routine work, 
ineffective PHA and 
inspection 
Complacency of 
technical experts 
Table 1. Root causes of some process incidents in the oil and gas sector (US CSB 2015a) 
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Such undesirable events lead to one conclusion: that the process sector is still struggling 
to implement an effective PSM program that ensures process integrity. Moreover, these 
developments increased the discussion among professionals and researchers about the way 
companies are managing their process safety and the extent of PSM program integration within 
the overall EHS management system, since the development in personal safety performance was 
not followed with a progress in process safety performance.  
1.1 Background: 
1.1.1 Process Safety Management (PSM) 
US OSHA defined Process Safety Management (PSM) as “the proactive identification, 
evaluation and mitigation or prevention of chemical releases that occur as a result of failures in 
processes, procedures, or equipment” (US OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 Appendix C 1992). In the 
United States and Europe, companies that run processes covered by at least one of the PSM 
regulations have to comply with the provisions of those regulations and implement a program for 
the management of process safety. While the OSHA PSM of Highly Hazardous Chemicals 
standard came to protect workplace safety including the safety of operators, subcontractors, and 
visitors inside the facility, the purpose of EPA Risk Management Plan (CAA Section 112 r) is to 
ensure the safety of the community surrounding the plant (EPA 2013). The uniform PSM 
program prescribed by EPA and OSHA regulations aimed to guarantee the minimum level of 
process safety performance in U.S. plants. However, this command and control approach did not 
achieve all of its intended outcomes in preventing or mitigating process incidents. In fact, the 
U.S. CSB has been criticizing the OSHA PSM standard and requested major changes on the 
standard about broadening its scope, amending the list and concentrations of regulated chemicals 
in order to cope with reactive chemicals hazards (Simmons et al. 2009; CSB 2013).  
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 The Center of Chemical Process Safety (CCSP) presented a broader definition and scope 
for the PSM program, and considered it as “A program or activity involving the application of 
management principles and analytical techniques to ensure the safety of chemical process 
facilities” (CCPS 1995). In fact, this approach enables companies to manage process safety as an 
integrated subsystem of the overall EHS management system. Hence, PSM is included in the 
planning, implementation, checking, and review of the EHS management system.  
1.1.2 Organizational safety culture 
The concept of safety culture emerged after the nuclear disaster of Chernobyl on April 
26, 1986, which “was the most severe in the history of the nuclear power industry, causing a 
huge release of radio nuclides over large areas of Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation” 
(IAEA 2015). The findings of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) 
pointed to the lack of safety culture as the root cause behind the deviation from testing 
procedures of turbo generators in Unit 4 and other major deficiencies in the design and operation 
of the plant (IAEA 1992). Since then, many definitions have been given to safety culture based 
on the perspective of researchers. Discussion has been mainly about the nature of safety culture: 
whether it is an output variable related to the organizational culture and safety performance, or 
an aspect of the organizational culture. The International Atomic Energy Agency, along with 
many other researchers, consider safety culture as an aspect of an organization’s culture and 
defined it as “that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals 
which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive attention 
warranted by their significance” (IAEA 1992). In the same vein, Hale (2000) depicted safety 
culture as “the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions shared by natural groups as defining norms and 
values, which determine how they act and react in relation to risks and risk control systems.” 
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Furthermore, Ciavarelli and Crowson (2004) provided a similar broad definition of safety culture 
(as cited in Mannan et al. 2013, 1425), which meant for them “an organization’s shared attitudes, 
values, norms, and beliefs about safety, including attitudes about danger, risk, and the proper 
conduct of hazardous operations.” 
Many studies considered safety culture as a multidimensional concept. Parker et al. 
(2006) supported this perspective since safety culture literature emphasizes the value of safety-
related attitudes and the activities of managers. In fact, researchers suggested several elements as 
important dimensions of safety culture. Filho et al. (2010) outlined the most frequently cited 
safety culture dimensions in literature, which are information, organizational learning, employee 
involvement, internal safety communication, and management commitment. These dimensions 
are interrelated and their effective functioning is a prerequisite for the success of organizational 
safety culture (Kilaparthi 2014). 
With regard to the information dimension, it concerns the system used within an 
organization to report safety information such as incidents and near misses, safety performance, 
etc. Kilaparthi (2014) discussed the importance of the information dimension and argued that it 
“brings attention towards right flow and distribution of information to the right people from the 
right source. Right flow of information is necessary to avoid any kind of miscommunication and 
taking rights actions at the right time.” Organizational learning deals with the way the 
organization exploits the information resulting from accidents or near misses and how it is 
communicated to employees or other external parties.  
Employee involvement concerns their participation in the management of EHS. In an 
organization with a good safety culture, employees are more engaged in EHS activities like 
accident investigations, risk assessments, safety committees, etc. Moreover, they are empowered 
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to stop operations whenever an unsafe condition arises and report it openly to the management. 
Mannan et al. (2013) added “Best-in-Class management seeks to maximize employee 
engagement with safety by treating workers fairly, encouraging employee participation in the 
safety systems, and providing open lines of communication across the organization.” In practice, 
employee involvement is a requirement in many national and international standards like 
ANSI/Z10, OHSAS 18001, EMAS III, and ISO 14001, as well as laws and regulations such as 
the Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals standard (29 CFR 1910.119) 
and the European Directive 2012/18/EU (i.e. SEVESO III Directive).  
 Internal safety communication is one of the crucial elements of a good safety culture. A 
two-way flow of safety information should circulate between the top and bottom levels of 
organization. According to Mannan et al. (2013), the information flow from the board of 
directors down to the shop floor is about safety policies, goals, and expectations of an 
organization. Whereas, the feedback flow is about EHS performance, and represents the 
information flow from the shop floor and rising to the board of directors. To ensure that the 
message from the top level of the organization is well received by those working on the shop 
floor, Mannan et al. (2013) suggested that the definition of roles and responsibilities for the 
middle levels of the organization (e.g. senior managers, middle managers, and frontline 
supervisors) in terms of receiving and communicating the safety message. In addition, the 
existence of open communication channels to forward the feedback of employees about EHS 
management to the upper levels of the organization is required for the effectiveness of safety 
communication.  
  Management commitment is the most important element for the effective performance 
of the other safety culture dimensions and for the establishment of a good safety culture as well. 
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Commitment to safety improvement in the workplace should be through the visible recognition 
of the management that safety is a core value for the business and not just a cost of operation or 
production. In organizations that have a good safety culture, their top management commitment 
toward safety is often translated with their leadership by example, setting clear safety goals and 
policies and allocating resources to achieve them, striving to maintain an open and trustful 
environment for communication with employees, integration of risk management in the overall 
decision making process, etc.     
For companies in the process sector, special attention should be given to the safety 
culture as it can affect both the personal safety and process safety performance (Mannan et al. 
2013). This infers that the maturity of the organizational safety culture would have an influence 
on the effectiveness of the PSM program. For instance, safety culture has a strong influence on 
employee participation in process safety activities, the effectiveness of process maintenance and 
inspections, the implementation of best operating practices for processes, etc. In fact, major 
global accidents in the oil and gas or even nuclear sectors such as the Piper Alpha disaster in 
1988, the Bhopal disaster in 1984, the BP Texas City refinery explosion in 2005, etc. occurred 
because of poor organizational safety culture. Therefore, safety culture became the current wave 
of evolution in the process safety management, as discussed in the Chapter 2.  
1.1.3 Oil and gas sector 
The oil and gas sector is one of the main sources of energy internationally, and the most 
profitable industry for many countries and multinational companies. The international 
consumption of oil and other petroleum liquids was estimated at 179 quadrillion Btu in 2010, and 
is projected to exceed 197 quadrillion Btu by 2020 (U.S. EIA 2014a). This important demand is 
met by an increased production of oil, gas, and other derivatives. In 2011, the total world 
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production of petroleum and other liquids was 87.8 million barrels per day, and will increase to 
97.6 million barrels per day in 2020, as projected in the 2014 International Energy Outlook (U.S. 
EIA 2014b).   
However, the production of oil and gas involves many complex, costly, and hazardous 
activities that require a well-founded decision before investing in the sector. Activities in this 
sector can be grouped under four different categories: exploration, oil extraction, refining, and 
transporting and marketing of oil and its derivatives (Schneider et al. 2011).   
In the exploration stage, companies try to locate regions where formations bearing 
hydrocarbons deposits would be promising for production and investment. For this, they use 
different tools and methods such as geologic, geochemical, geophysical, and survey methods. 
Recent advancements in technology like three-dimensional (3D) and four-dimensional (4D) 
seismic imaging help in increasing the accuracy in locating and estimating the volume of onshore 
and offshore hydrocarbon deposits. The evaluation of the promising deposits can be completed 
after drilling exploratory wells. Very important data can be obtained such as the properties and 
extent of deposits, characteristics of formations, etc. (Hilyard 2012). 
The oil extraction phase starts after the exploration results yield the existence of 
interesting deposits and predict that economic profits would be made. To get crude oil to the 
surface, oil wells are drilled from the beginning until well completion. Usually, the crude oil 
produced from multiple wells is collected and sent through pipelines to production sites for 
separation and processing (U.S. EPA 2000). 
The refining stage of crude oil consists of many operations such as distillation, 
conversion, treatment, formulating and blending, and other products recovery and waste 
treatment (OSHA 1999). At the end of refining, different products can be derived from crude oil, 
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which are grouped in three main categories: fuels (e.g. gasoline, liquefied petroleum gas, 
kerosene, etc.), finished nonfuel products (e.g. solvents, lubricating oils, greases, etc.), and 
chemical industry feedstock (e.g. naphtha, ethane, propane, etc.) (Schneider et al. 2011). These 
products are transported and commercialized to the end-users like industrials or fuel stations, 
which concludes the last stage of petroleum production activities. 
The aforementioned activities pose significant hazards to the environment, employees’ 
and community health and safety, and the safety of facilities themselves. Accidents that occurred 
in the sector over decades were due to the nature and quantities of chemicals and products used 
and the complexity of processes, along with poor control over risks like chemical, pressure, and 
mechanical hazards, and resulted in tremendous human and material losses as well as 
environmental damage. Such undesirable events jeopardized the business of many oil and gas 
companies and tarnished their reputation and image. An example of these mishaps is the 
Chevron Richmond Refinery fire that occurred on August 6, 2012. The corrosion of a 52-inch 
long pipe led to its rupture and caused the leakage of flammable hydrocarbon fluid in Crude Unit 
# 04. According to the US CSB, the released material “partially vaporized into a large vapor 
cloud that engulfed 19 Chevron employees and ignited,” (US CSB 2015b). The ignition of that 
material resulted in a plume of vapor, particulates, and smoke that covered the nearby areas. 
Although no injuries were recorded among employees, the local community in Richmond, 
California, was significantly affected: “Approximately 15,000 people from the surrounding area 
sought medical treatment due to the release” (US CSB 2015b). The investigation report outlined 
key issues in Chevron’s PSM programs (e.g. poor inspection program, lack of knowledge about 
process hazards among employees, lack of management commitment, etc.) and emergency 
response (e.g. failure to follow the OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency 
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Response standard, poor communication, no emergency protocol at Chevron at the day of 
incident), in addition to deficiencies in mechanical integrity industry and leak evaluation and 
response industry standards (like API 570, API RP 571, and API RP 574). Interestingly, the 
report highlighted safety culture shortcomings that contributed to this process incident such as 
reluctance of employees to use their stop-work authority, a decision-making system that allowed 
operations to continue while the release of flammable material occurred, and substandard 
equipment maintenance practices.   
Process safety management has gained the interest of industry and academia over the last 
decades as major incidents did not cease despite recent developments in process design, 
knowledge, and standards. On June 5, 2014, when the US CSB presented its final investigation 
finding about the Blow Out Preventer (BOP) failure during the Deepwater Horizon disaster in 
the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, Investigator MacKenzie stated, “Although there have 
been regulatory improvements since the accident, the effective management of safety critical 
elements has yet to be established. This results in potential safety gaps in U.S. offshore 
operations and leaves open the possibility of another similar catastrophic accident” (US CSB 
2014).   
1.1.4 PSM in the oil and gas sector in Algeria 
Over the last decade, the Algerian oil and gas sector has experienced catastrophic 
incidents that led to human losses and material damage. On January 19, 2004, an explosion 
flattened a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant owned and operated by the national hydrocarbon 
company Sonatrach in Skikda, 500 km east of the capital, Algiers. This tragic accident that 
resulted in 30 deaths and more than 70 injuries was considered the most significant accident in 
the history of the process industry in Algeria since the 1970s. It also raised inquiries about the 
11 
 
safety of LNG plants internationally, especially in the US, as the media reported the concerns of 
the citizens in cities proposed to have new LNG terminals (Romero 2004). The investigation 
findings revealed that a faulty boiler was behind the massive explosion, and highlighted several 
failures in terms of PSM mainly about mechanical integrity and preventive maintenance, 
employee training, and process hazard management (Sakhri Larnene 2012).  
Due to the catastrophic consequences of that major accident, on December 25, 2004, the 
government passed Act 04-20 on the prevention of major risks and disaster management in the 
context of sustainable development, and was followed later by Executive Decree 06-198 of May 
31, 2006 which stipulated the provisions applicable on classified installations.  
The promulgation of these laws and regulations did not prevent the occurrence of other 
accidents either at the same refinery or at other facilities. Chetouh and Hamzi (2014) analyzed 
the accidents that occurred at the same plant between 2002 and 2013. Their study illustrated that 
34 accidents took place after the famous one of January 2004, and three of them happened in the 
same year. It is important to note that many other significant accidents occurred in other sites in 
the south of Algeria over the last decade. However, due to the lack of published data and records 
about them, it is difficult to provide further details about their circumstances.  
The recent attack on the Tiguentourine gas plant in In Aminas, located 1300 km southeast 
of the capital Algiers and fewer than 80 km from the Libyan border, has proven another aspect of 
weakness in the organizational resilience of Sonatrach and its associates operating at that site, 
British Petroleum, and Statoil. On January 16, 2013, an armed group attacked the plant in the 
desert of Algeria and held hundreds of employees of different nationalities hostages. After four 
days of encirclement, the intervention of Algerian troops to free the hostages and secure the plant 
ended with dramatic results: the number of deaths reached at least 37 foreign hostages in 
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addition to the 29 militants (Reuters 2013). Furthermore, the plant had significant damage due to 
the blasts and fire that occurred at the moment of military intervention.  
The investigation conducted by Statoil about this accident confirmed the failure of 
internal and external controls to secure people and assets. Moreover, the investigators also shed 
light on major gaps in security risk management, which would have helped the attackers to take 
control on the plant (Statoil 2013). The failure to resist the security threat was because of the 
isolation in the function of the inner security (internal security) and outer security (Algerian 
Army) protection layers of the facility. In fact, the inner security layer was weak and designed 
based on the assumption that the outer security layers would be capable of detecting and reacting 
to any security threats. Thus, the investigators found that “At In Aminas, inner physical security 
measures were not constructed to withstand or delay an armed assault and certainly not an attack 
of this scale” (Statoil 2013). Furthermore and over years, the joint venture plant built full 
reliance on the outer security layers (armed forces) to protect the plant and no scenarios were 
developed for the situations where this layer fails to detect or resist an attack. Moreover, the joint 
venture plant never received complete details about the capabilities of these armed forces 
although they were part of the security plans. Finally, the investigation report urged Statoil to 
strengthen its security measures and culture when it comes to doing business in unstable and 
complex environments (Statoil 2013). The findings of Statoil investigation match the statement 
of Bajpai and Gupta (2005) who asserted that terrorists target facilities with less security 
measures where they can cause significant damage.      
This accident raised again concerns about the level of security maintained at each of the 
oil and gas plants in the country. In order to improve its resilience against external perturbation 
(security threats), Sonatrach and its partners conducted a review of their security plans and 
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strengthened security measures through the presence of military units nearby the major oil and 
gas plants in the south, re-conducting a background security check program on all the employees, 
and reinforcement of security controls on the movement of expats in remote oilfields in the 
south, just to name few.  
The above sequence of accidents in Sonatrach over the last decade illustrates that the 
company took a step forward in the management of process safety by expanding the PSM 
program to include the external security of facilities. The focus of Sonatrach was about the 
improvement of process safety controls at all the facilities after the Skikda’s disaster of 2004, 
shifted to strengthen the external security measures of facilities in the aftermath of Tiguentourine 
attack of 2013. This step has been widely adopted by process companies especially after the 9/11 
in the US in 2001, where organizations started to incorporate security risks in the management of 
process safety (Bajpai and Gupta 2005; Bajpai and Gupta 2007; Reniers and Amyotte 2012). 
Indeed, Reniers and Amyotte (2012) argued that process companies assumed that security threats 
would be unlikely to happen. However, this perception changed after the 9/11 events where 
security risks are managed due to the significant economic and material damage associated with 
them.       
1.2 Research Objectives  
 Since the aforementioned incidents seem grounded in ineffective PSM, this work will 
attempt to assess the maturity of PSM at Sonatrach by evaluating: 
1- The effectiveness of Sonatrach’s PSM program as a part of the overall EHS 
management system through assessment of the key characteristics of a functional PSM 
program at Sonatrach, and 
1- a. How this is indicative of the state of PSM in developing countries. 
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2- Given the results, provide recommendations for an appropriate path forward for 
Sonatrach to fully implement and improve PSM beyond adoption of standards. 
1.3 Significance of the study 
Despite the technological advancement in process design and operation, companies in the 
process sector could not cope with the frequent process incidents over the last decade. These 
incidents, which resulted in significant losses for companies, triggered the discussion again about 
the qualities of an effective PSM program, and led to initiating a review in academia about the 
past, current, and future of process safety in the 21st century. Researchers have focused lately on 
reviewing the current challenges related to PSM in the process industry and recommended future 
directions for improvement of PSM performance in the sector. However, there is a significant 
gap in knowledge and many questions remain unanswered. For the MKO Process Safety Center 
(2011), “the effects of this knowledge gap are evident; even today, reliable data for examples on 
failure rates are scare.” Hence, this work aims to contribute to the current efforts in 
understanding what impedes process companies from improving their process safety 
performance. 
Furthermore, an overview on the existing literature shows that most of the research and 
scientific symposia concerns European and U.S. companies with little existence of research 
about process safety in developing countries, where a majority of processing, especially 
chemically related or high hazardous processing occurs. Therefore, this work will bridge this gap 
through the collection and analysis of real-world data from companies.   
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1.4 Definitions 
1.4.1 Process   
According to the CCSP (2015), a process is “A broad term that includes the equipment 
and technology needed for petrochemical production, including reactors, tanks, piping, boilers, 
cooling towers, refrigeration systems, etc.”   
1.4.2 PSM metrics 
PSM metrics have been of great interest for safety professionals and researchers since the 
last decade. There was a debate among professionals about the quality and number of metrics to 
be adopted by each plant or facility. A work led by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers 
in collaboration with representatives of process industry companies, regulators, and researchers 
resulted in the development of guidelines for the definition and use of leading and lagging 
metrics for PSM (CCPS 2009). The CCPS (2009) presented a PSM metric as “a standard of 
measurement or indicator of process safety management efficiency or performance.” A similar 
effort was made by the Health and Safety Executive of the United Kingdom to recommend an 
approach for the development of PSM indicators by senior managers and safety professionals in 
the chemical and major hazard industries (UK HSE 2006a).  
1.4.3 Leading and lagging indicators 
The CCSP (2015) defined leading indicators as “Process-oriented metrics, such as the 
degree of implementation or conformance to policies and procedures that support the PSM 
program management system and has the capability of predicting performance.” Whereas, 
lagging indicators are defined to be “Outcome-oriented metrics, such as incident rates, 
downtime, quality defects, or other measures of past performance.” 
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 To identify and distinguish between the two types of indicators, the U.S. API (2010) 
adopted the Heinrich model of 1931 (i.e. accident-pyramid) to define leading and lagging 
indicators, and argued that “It is believed that a similar predictive relationship exists between 
lower and higher consequence events that relate to process safety. Indicators that are predictive 
are considered leading indicators and may be used to identify a weakness that can be corrected 
before a higher consequence event occurs” (API 2010). The Heinrich model suggests that there 
is a relationship between personal safety events with higher and lower effects. In other words, an 
incident that occurs with severe consequences would be preceded by many events with less 
severity.  
The U.S. API (2010) defined four types of performance indicators: Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3, 
and Tier 4). Tier 1 performance indicators count the rate of Tier 1 process safety events that 
include any event that involves an uncontrolled or unplanned release of process material, which 
results in a fire or an explosion that costs the company more than 25,000 USD as a direct cost, a 
fatality or injury of an operator or a subcontractor employee leading to days away from work, 
hospital admission of a third party employee, “an officially declared community evacuation or 
community shelter-in-place,” etc. (API 2010). Tier 2 performance indicators count the rate of 
loss of primary containment (LOPC) events with lesser consequences (Tier 2 events) such as a 
recordable injury of an employee, contractor or subcontractor, a fire or explosion that costs 
greater than or equal to $2,500 as direct cost, a release of material greater than the threshold 
quantities provided in the severity chart of Tier 2 events in any one-hour period, etc. (API 2010). 
With regard to Tier 3 performance indicators, they measure Tier 3 events that represent any 
excursion of Safe Operating Limits (SOL) that took place in a specific period of time (API 
2010). The last type of performance indicators are Tier 4 ones that “represent performance of 
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individual components of the barrier system and are comprised of operating discipline and 
management system performance” (API 2010).  
The aforementioned standard considered Tier 4 performance indicators, which are about 
operating discipline and management system performance, at the bottom of the pyramid as the 
most leading indicator. They would be used as predictors of shortcomings that would lead or 
contribute to the occurrence of future process incidents with higher or lower consequences (Tier 
1 and Tier 2 process safety events). In addition, Tier 4 indicators (leading indicators) would be 
useful for internal use of the facility to identify learning opportunities and improve safety 
management performance.   
At the top of the pyramid, Tier 1 performance indicators are the most lagging indicators 
that serve to count process safety events characterized by loss of process containment with high 
consequences. These lagging indicators in addition to Tier 2 indicators, would provide an idea 
about the past PSM performance of the company. Both leading and lagging indicators would 
help process companies assess and improve their PSM performance. De Rademaeker et al. (2014) 
depicted “To sustainably maintain and continuously improve process safety culture, it is at the 
same time essential that process safety performance indicators, both lagging and leading, are 
meaningful and easy to understand for the entire organization from shift workers, plant 
engineers, and plant managers to top management.” 
1.5 Structure of the work 
  The remainder of this work is structured as follows: the next chapter outlines the findings 
of literature review about the effectiveness of PSM and current PSM issues the process sector. 
The methodology of research is discussed in the third chapter. The results and analysis of 
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collected data is the subject of the fourth chapter. Finally, this work ends with general 
conclusions and suggested recommendations for improvement and future research.       
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter goes through the literature and describes what the best-in-class PSM 
program looks like. Then, the evolution of PSM in the process industry and the current PSM 
issues in the sector are illustrated.  
2.1 Quality PSM program 
Motivated by the frequent occurrence of major accidents in the process industry, several 
studies have questioned the effectiveness of PSM programs implemented by companies in the 
sector. Indeed, the investigation reports, published by the U.S. CSB over the last decade, show 
that serious process accidents still occur in the process sector. Moreover, Louvar (2008) reported 
that 50% of accidents occurred in facilities covered by the PSM standard. Researchers in the 
field of process safety have attempted to define the features of a quality PSM program. The 
following characteristics were found to be the most common ones cited in research. 
2.1.1 Safety culture and positive attitude 
Safety culture, a subset of the organizational culture, is the underlying background for the 
safety performance of any company. Therefore, having a good safety culture would prevent the 
occurrence of an important number of incidents. Safety culture improvement got special 
attention after the major disasters in the sector in the late 1980s and the early 1990s such as the 
Bhopal and Seveso disasters. Many companies have undergone an assessment for their safety 
culture after major accidents in the sector. However, they were challenged in defining a good 
safety culture. To overcome this shortcoming, Olive et al. (2006) defined the characteristics of 
and steps to build a good safety culture in the chemical industry. Furthermore, Knegtering and 
Pasman (2009) reviewed three of the major accidents that occurred in the last decade, and 
concluded that “a holistic approach of leadership, empowerment and participation, with 
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continual alertness of top management, a dedicated reliability and safety attitude trickling down 
through the organization,” are essential to improve safety performance. 
2.1.2 PSM performance measurement 
 The measurement of PSM performance is a crucial step toward the continuous 
improvement of PSM performance. Researchers asserted that an effective PSM program should 
entail PSM indicators to measure the program’s performance. For instance, Arendt (2006) argued 
that the effectiveness of a PSM program is depending upon PSM performance and PSM 
efficiency. Therefore, process companies have to adopt leading and lagging PSM indicators as 
part of the overall EHS management system indicators. Mannan (2005) stated that proactive or 
leading indicators are suitable for the monitoring of some items like achievement of objectives, 
compliance with procedures and standards, auditing effectiveness, and state of documentation. 
Meanwhile, reactive measures (lagging indicators) can be used in the monitoring of injuries, 
material losses and damages, plant deteriorations, and incidents. However, the process industry 
has struggled to select and adopt the best lagging and leading indicators to drive continuous 
improvement of PSM. Kadri et al. (2014) argued that near miss indicators related to process 
engineering design along with API Tier 3 (i.e. challenges to safety systems) indicators would be 
the best ones, so far, to provide an insight on potential occurrence of process safety events. The 
U.S. API (2010) stressed that “Selecting appropriate indicators using unbiased and broad-based 
input will lead to a high-performing program” Moreover, the standard presented high-level 
guidelines on the selection of leading and lagging indicators through the use of past incidents 
investigation findings to identify safety controls failures, use of PHA and risk assessment to 
identify high potential events, and any lessons learned from the industry about successful 
indicators.   
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2.1.3 Integration of PSM program into the overall EHS management system 
 A PSM program would not attain its desired outcomes unless it is fully integrated into the 
overall EHS management system of the company. This integration concerns the planning, 
implementation, checking, and reviewing of the PSM program as part of the EHS management 
system. As Louvar (2008) explained, “PSM implementation and utilization processes can be 
significantly improved with some additional practices, for example, PSM should be integrated in 
an effective management system that enhances success.”  
2.1.4 Training, education, competency, and continuous learning 
 
Training and competency of process employees are not only legal requirements for 
process companies, but are among the characteristics of a quality PSM program. Companies 
have to ensure that their employees are fully trained and competent to perform process 
operations and maintenance, in compliance with the operating procedures. In fact, employees 
have to enjoy a minimum level of education in chemistry, engineering, and other fields. Mannan 
(2004) made a distinction between training and education and noted that education means a 
broad body of knowledge; meanwhile, training refers to the necessary knowledge and tools for a 
specific operation or task. With regard to process employees’ education, Lovar (2008), for 
instance, argued that process engineers have to master the fundamentals of chemical reactivity, 
inherent safety controls, and chemical process safety (i.e. flammability, deflagration, etc.), just to 
cite a few elements, in order to protect the integrity of processes. 
Moreover, companies with a quality PSM program should have a learning system that 
allows a feedback flow of information from normal and abnormal situations and incorporate it 
into the design, operation, and maintenance of processes, in order to continuously improve the 
PSM performance. Costella et al. (2009) explained that companies have “to emphasize 
22 
 
understanding normal work rather than just learning from incidents, in order to learn and to 
disseminate successful working strategies.” Additionally, Mannan et al. (2013) considered that 
capture and implementation of lessons learned from incidents is one of the attributes of best-in-
class organizations, and there is no good reason for them to ignore those lessons. Learning from 
incidents requires in the first place having an effective process that ensures thorough and 
comprehensive incident investigations along with a transparent and well-implemented reporting 
system for incidents and near misses. 
2.1.5 Robust document management system 
The management of PSM documentation necessitates having a reliable system in place 
for the appropriate storage, retrieval, and accessibility to process documents by process 
employees. One of the features of an effective PSM program is the control of PSM reports and 
technical documentation such as process maintenance reports, operating procedures, equipment 
manuals and drawings, process operation and condition, etc. King (2013) suggested that “The 
technical evidence of a strong PSM program will include a robust document management system 
where all the PSM-related reports and procedures reside, and which is readily available to those 
personnel that need access to the information.”     
2.1.6 Top management commitment and leadership 
 
While the commitment and leadership of top management in process companies are vital 
prerequisites for establishing a positive safety culture, they are also of importance for an 
effective PSM program. King (2013) asserted, “If management is about doing things the right 
way, leadership is about doing the right things. Both are necessary for sustained growth and 
continuing success. Excellence in process safety requires good management and effective 
leadership.” Indeed, top management of companies must lead by example: The safe actions and 
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positive attitude of top management spreads among employees the commitment of the company 
to establish a safe work environment (Mannan et al. 2013). In fact, positive attitude and 
commitment of top management were also looked at by Knegtering and Pasman (2009), as one 
of the principals for a holistic approach to manage process safety, in addition to process 
reliability, employee participation, measurement metrics, etc.            
2.1.7 Stakeholder engagement/communication 
Researchers deemed the active engagement of internal and external stakeholders in PSM 
as a sign of a quality PSM program. Process employees and contractors are the main internal 
stakeholders for a PSM program. Their engagement should be reflected in participation in 
process safety activities, such as process risk management, incident investigation, procedures 
development and revision, training sessions, inspection and audits, etc. However, Mannan et al. 
(2013) related the active engagement of internal stakeholders with the fair treatment of 
employees, encouragement to participate in safety management, and opening communication 
channels between the upper and lower levels of the organization. By the same token, King 
(2013) recommended the involvement of external stakeholders who may have an interest in 
process safety like legal and local authorities, local community members, organizations, etc. in 
different PSM activities.  
As for communication, researchers asserted that an effective and timely communication 
with internal and external stakeholders is an attribute of companies that have an effective PSM 
program. In their study about critical communication interfaces between PSM stakeholders, 
Kelly and Berger (2006) argued “a well-functioning process safety program depends on 
maintaining successful communication interfaces between each involved employee or 
stakeholder and the many other employees or stakeholders that person must interact with.” 
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Internal PSM communication covers many elements of the PSM program such as process 
operations, abnormal situations, risks and safeguards, employees’ suggestions, etc. as well as any 
revisions or changes to these elements. In addition, external communication with local 
communities ought to be an integrated part of the overall communication strategy of the 
company. Community outreach can be carried out via arranging open meetings with the 
community, awareness and training about process risks and emergency plans, and online means 
of communication, in order to capture the expectations and concerns of the local community, 
help them understand what risks they are exposed to, and what they have to do in case of 
emergency situations where the effects go beyond the facility premises. Moreover, a best-in-class 
PSM program maintains reliable communication links with other external stakeholders like legal 
authorities, professional groups, competitors, etc. in order to ensure a sustainable process safety 
performance.          
2.1.8 Preparedness/early warning/detection and anticipation 
 
With the emergence of the resilience concepts and principals, preparedness, detection, 
and anticipation became attributes of a highly resilient process. Therefore, a PSM program has to 
ensure that processes can detect and anticipate any deviation from normal operating conditions to 
abnormal situations. Dinh et al. (2012) stated, “If the system has the ability to detect disturbances 
and manipulate operating variables accordingly (a function of a process control system), it is 
likely to stay in the normal state.” This target requires highly reliable equipment along with 
monitoring actions on the process condition.   
Although efforts should be dedicated to preventive measures, companies must also take 
into consideration their preparedness for emergency situations. An effective PSM program pays 
attention to the effectiveness and efficiency of activities like drills and simulation exercises about 
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the most potential incident scenarios. These activities enable companies to evaluate where they 
stand in terms of preparedness to respond to any emergency situation, and draw conclusions for 
further improvement in their efficiency. 
2.1.9 Flexibility 
 
One of the attributes of a resilient process is flexibility. A flexible process implies its 
ability to detect, adapt, and react to any external disturbances. These disturbances could be 
natural (e.g. earthquakes and hurricanes), human-made (e.g. terrorist acts, sabotage), or 
technological (e.g. effects of deflagrations or fires in neighbor plants). These latter disturbances 
occurred several times in the history of the process industry, in cases where process plants were 
clustered together within a specific area like production terminals. A quality PSM program must 
guarantee that processes are flexible and can absorb such disturbances. It is worthwhile to note 
that this attribute has nothing to do with incident prevention but with recovery from those 
disturbances. In this context, Dinh et al. (2012) noted that, “Resilience engineering helps to 
recover system states after incidents happen rather than prevent incidents from occurring. 
Incident prevention is a subject of study in other process safety areas (e.g., risk assessment).” 
Costella et al. (2009) went beyond process flexibility and addressed the organizational flexibility 
in general as a feature for the EHS management system. They argued that, “work system design 
must be flexible, recognizing that variability management is as important as variability reduction. 
In fact, design should support the natural human strategies for coping with hazards, rather than 
enforce a particular strategy.” However, this approach would allow deviation from safe practices 
and best operating procedures, thus incidents may occur.   
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2.1.10 Awareness of system status 
A company with an effective PSM program should be able to track the actual status of 
processes and predict future changes that may affect these changes. This feature can be fulfilled 
through effective and timely activities like process inspections, audits, and maintenance 
activities. 
 2.2 Evolution of PSM in the process industry  
Before establishing a quality PSM program in the process sector, PSM went through 
different development stages over the last fifty years. Those developments were mainly driven 
by technological and engineering advancements, major incidents, and emerging legal 
requirements and standards. The process sector started its first steps toward process integrity in 
the 1960s via the improvement of materials and equipment reliability. While the sector was 
focused on further enhancements of technical aspects of process operations and design, the 
Flixborough disaster in England on June 1, 1974, shifted the focus of industry to human errors 
and factors. Indeed, this incident occurred due to the failure of chemical engineers to manage a 
plant modification properly. This disaster gave rise to risk analysis methodologies like Hazard 
Operability (HAZOP) in the management of process operations risks. During the 1980s, process 
companies became much more aware of the importance of human reliability (i.e. of process 
operators, engineers, and maintenance personnel) in the PSM as experience showed that 
technical reliability was not enough to attain the full integrity of processes. Therefore, written 
procedures on human behaviors for process maintenance and operation were developed (Pasman 
and Suter 2004).   
However, the process sector awoke after other major accidents like the Bhopal disaster in 
1984, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, and later the Piper Alpha explosion in 1988, which 
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brought the attention of governments and process companies to the importance of management 
attitude and commitment and organizational safety culture in general for the PSM. Consequently, 
new PSM regulations were adopted or amended in Europe (i.e. Seveso Directive I amended on 
1987 and 1988) and in the United States (i.e. Section 112 (r) of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, and OSHA PSM of Highly Hazardous Chemicals regulation in 1992). These 
regulations put process facilities under the scrutiny of regulatory agencies. 
With the emergence of management system standards in 1990s, there was a new tendency 
to adopt a systematic approach in the PSM. This advancement was revivified with the 
acknowledgment by process companies of the importance of successful EHS management in 
business. National and international standards about functional safety like ANSI/ISA-84.01 on 
safety instrumented functions of 1996 and IEC 61508 standard on functional safety of 
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems of 1998 became common 
and widely adopted in the process industry. 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, discussion about the role of organizational 
safety culture in implementing an effective PSM program was again triggered with the 
occurrence of BP Texas City refinery mishap in 2005, although the safety culture concept had 
been known since the 1980s after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Based on the Baker Report 
(known also as BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel), the process industry should 
move a step forward in incorporating leading indicators that measure the effectiveness of 
leadership and safety culture practices in the measurement of PSM performance (UK HSE 2007). 
In this context, the U.S CCPS published its guidelines for process safety metrics in 2009. Pasman 
and Suter (2004) summarized in Figure 1 the evolution of safety performance since 1960s in the 
process industry. 
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Figure 1. Process safety evolution since 1960s (Pasman and Suter 2004) 
2.3 Process Safety Management Issues in the Process Sector 
After five decades, process companies still struggle to establish quality PSM programs, 
and have been facing common issues in their PSM programs. In the following section, a 
literature review will shed light on the most reported issues in the last decade internationally that 
impede companies from having an outstanding PSM program.  
2.3.1 Process safety performance measurement  
Companies in the sector have for a long time settled for the use of OSHA rates of illness 
and injury as measures of their process safety performance, and ignored the use of leading 
indicators (Qi et al. 2012; Mannan et al. 2010). For instance, in the aftermath of the BP refinery 
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explosion at Texas City in 2005, the U.S. CSB (2007) revealed “Reliance on the low personal 
injury rate at Texas City as a safety indicator failed to provide a true picture of process safety 
performance and the health of the safety culture.” This was behind the request of the U.S. CSB to 
the U.S. API to develop new performance indicators specific to process safety management. The 
Baker report recommended adopting leading indicators of process safety management by BP and 
all other companies in the sector (BP 2007).  
Following the Baker report, the U.S CCSP developed Process Safety Leading and 
Lagging Metrics at the end of 2007, in order to be used in benchmarking process safety 
performance among companies. These guidelines were updated later and aligned with the API 
standard, so definitions of Tier events would be similar and companies can use either of them. 
The API issued its ANSI/API Recommended Practice 754 in April 2010, which defined new 
process safety event metrics (Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3, and Tier 4 performance indicators). However, 
this standard remains voluntary and companies may choose not to disseminate publically their 
statistics annually.      
  Even though the CSB aimed to bring the focus of companies toward process safety risks, 
some of the API process safety indicators remain lagging, and there is a need to set additional 
leading indicators beyond Tier 4 indicators (i.e. performance indicators). Indeed, Ardent (2006) 
stated that, “an increasing number of companies are experimenting and/or learning from 
adopting PSM leading indicators of performance.” Furthermore, the evaluation of ANSI/API 
Recommended Practice 754 indicators conducted by Mendeloff et al. (2013) showed that only 
large companies would be able to distinguish between Tier 1 and Tier 2 events, but would 
struggle to benchmark the indicators relevant to those events.  
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 Finally, near misses have been ignored for a long time despite their importance as early 
warnings of potential unforeseen failures in process safety. Many companies in the process 
industry did not establish a near misses reporting system that facilitates their tracking and 
analysis (Knegtering and Pasman 2009).    
2.3.2 Training, competency, and continuous learning  
In view of the rapid development in process technologies and the increasing complexity of 
processes, many researchers reported a lack of awareness among employees about the new risks 
related to those processes or operations. In their study about the challenges and needs for process 
safety in the new millennium, Qi et al. (2012) reported: “process installations have become even 
more complex today than ever before. Process control and safeguarding equipment are more 
complex, thereby increasing newer risk which is often unforeseen.” This lack of awareness was 
behind many accidents in the sector, among other causes. Indeed, Bullemer et al. (2011) 
investigated the root causes of 32 accidents that occurred in the US and non-US facilities, in 
which failures in procedure execution during abnormal situations were detected. The researchers 
found that root causes like failure to detect an abnormal condition, failure to detect an abnormal 
situation, lack of awareness of process or of equipment hazards, or lack of understanding of the 
impact of actions were common among those accidents.     
Furthermore, companies in the sector have been facing tremendous pitfalls maintaining a 
satisfactory level of knowledge and training among employees. One of the reasons for this is 
high turnover rates and retirement among employees in the process sector, which contributed to 
the “erosion of knowledge and experience” (Knegtering and Pasman 2009; De Rademaeker et al. 
2014). In fact, Parry et al. (2007) predicted that 50% of employees in the sector would retire over 
the next ten years, while companies do not have qualified and trained replacements. One year 
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later, Hargreaves (2008) estimated that 80% of personnel in the petroleum sector would retire in 
the next decade while the sector failed to attract young, educated personnel. In their study about 
the PSM performance of small and medium enterprises in China, Zhao et al. (2013) found that 
knowledge management was one of the key shortcomings of the PSM programs in this type of 
organization, and recommended an effective transfer of knowledge among the stakeholders and 
SMEs in the process industry. 
With regard to learning systems, De Rademaeker et al. (2014) applauded the remarkable 
progress in the sector from understanding how accidents manifest to thinking about preventing 
them, through the implementation of inherent safety practices and focusing on safety culture. 
However, most of the process companies do not yet have a learning system that ensures a timely 
implementation and sharing of lessons learned with other interested parties of lessons learned 
from incidents (MKOPSC 2012; Qi et al. 2012; Mannan et al. 2010; Knegtering and Pasman 
2009). Pasman (2009) analyzed this particular issue and found that there is a deficiency in the 
use of recorded information from incident investigation in the operational control of processes. 
In addition, he affirmed that, “Much information is lost by not finding the root causes of 
accidents, and not analyzing the latent conditions and the effect on safety barriers.” 
Consequently, a good number of accidents in the sector could be prevented if the 
recommendations from accident investigation were shared and adopted by all the actors in the 
process industry.   
A practical example of this observation is the series of explosions and fires on December 
11, 2005, at Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot at Hemel Hempstead in the United 
Kingdom. This disaster, which occurred in the fifth largest storage terminal in the United 
Kingdom, resulted in catastrophic impacts and losses. The U.K. HSE investigated this mishap 
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and found that there was an ignition of gasoline coming from an overfilled tank (HSE 2007). 
Annex 5 of the initial investigation report outlined six accidents similar in nature and root causes 
to the Buncefield one, which occurred in the world between 1962 and 1999 (HSE 2006b). 
Although the implementation of recommendations from these accidents would prevent or at least 
mitigate the effects of the Buncefield disaster, obviously the sector struggles to learn from 
experiences, and accidents continue to take place worldwide. Therefore, an emphasis was given 
by researchers to the establishment of a learning system that feeds all the process stakeholders 
(designers, legislators, professional associations) with the necessary information in order to 
improve operational control of processes by companies, and enhance inherent safety design 
practices by process manufacturers (Pasman 2008).         
2.3.3 Robust documentation system 
Process operating procedures have been one of the most reported areas of weakness by 
many companies. For instance, the complexity of procedures, their number and accessibility are 
among the major concerns of employees in the sector (Høivik 2008; Shirali et al. 2012).   
2.3.4 Top management commitment and leadership  
Management commitment and leadership are one of the main internal drivers for an 
outstanding safety culture, and one of the pillars for a quality PSM program. However, 
researchers found that a lack of management commitment prevails in many process companies. 
In this context, Kilparthi (2014) asserted that top management of well-known oil and gas 
companies have paid less attention to the promotion of strong safety culture and core values 
within their organization for a long time. Høivik et al. (2009) confirmed this fact in their study 
about EHS culture in the Norwegian oil and gas sector. The interviewed employees were worried 
about the commitment of their management toward EHS management, and looked forward to “a 
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visible manager who spoke to people and showed interest in motivating for HSE, understanding 
HSE challenges and giving HSE credibility.” 
Contrary to the advancement in knowledge about process risks over the last decades, top 
management of many companies do not take into account risk assessment outcomes in decision-
making process. Information about risks is either simply ignored or neglected under other 
financial and market pressures like cost cutting, downsizing, and competition. Therefore, those 
decisions would expose processes and/or operations to higher levels of risks (Shirali et al. 2012; 
MKOPSC 2012; De Rademaeker et al. 2014). In addition to this pitfall and due to the same 
reasons cited above, the top management of these companies keeps the mindset of driving 
maximum efficiency and decreasing the operation time. This limited focus on the optimization of 
process function and production would result in cutting edges of safety barriers (Shirali et al. 
2012; MKOPSC 2012; Qi et al. 2012).    
2.3.5 Stakeholder engagement/communication 
Although employee participation in PSM is one of the requirements of many PSM 
regulations, the sector is still lagging in achieving a higher and active employee involvement in 
the management of process safety. In the framework of a research project led by the U.K. HSE 
about safety climate assessment in offshore environments, Cox and Cheyne (2000) found that “a 
large number of employees felt that they were not involved in, or informed of, safety initiatives,” 
and only a small number of them participate in safety programs and activities. In the same 
context, Kilaparthi (2014) stated that this element was one of the drawbacks to establish a strong 
safety culture in the Norwegian oil and gas sector. This issue can be viewed as a symptom of 
management failure to create a positive safety culture, which is necessary for an effective PSM 
program. As Mannan et al. (2013) explained, “Best-in-Class management seeks to maximize 
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employee engagement with safety by treating workers fairly, encouraging employee participation 
in the safety systems, and providing open lines of communication across the organization.”    
Another facet of the aforementioned shortcomings is the ineffective communication or 
lack of communication between employees and their management. In view of the internal 
communication model illustrated by Mannan et al. (2013), it is obvious that the distance between 
the different levels of a company would cut the flow of information about EHS goals and 
policies from the top management down to the floor shop and the feedback flow about EHS 
management from the floor shop up to the top management. In addition to internal 
communication problems, community outreach would know more challenges in the long term. 
As populations around facilities continue to grow and become highly exposed to risks, 
companies would see external pressures to be more socially responsible and enhance their 
external communication strategy. The MKO Process Safety Center (2012) argued that land 
planning and plant sitting would be an area to focus on, and recommended to facilitate dialog 
between industrials and communities about controversial ideas such as “risks” vs. “market and 
economy,” especially for existing facilities. 
2.3.6 Preparedness/early warning/detection and anticipation 
With the increased complexity of processes, human reliability has emerged as an area of 
improvement in an effort to reduce human errors especially during abnormal situations. Along 
with what Bullemer et al. (2011) found, accidents in the sector have been linked to a failure of 
human component (cognitive limits) and process deviation from normal situation.   
2.3.7 Flexibility 
The complexity of new processes enhanced the process control and safeguarding and 
enabled improving the quality of products, flexibility, and safety. However and as many 
35 
 
researchers asserted, this advancement is not a warranty for a fully safe process. The sector is 
increasingly witnessing unpredictable risks, which are aggravated by other organizational and 
human factors (Qi et al. 2012; MKOPSC 2012; Knegtering and Pasman 2009). 
2.3.8 Awareness of system status 
  The tendency towards outsourcing maintenance activities to small, specialized companies 
has become a norm instead of exception. This practice has resulted in additional issues about 
subcontractor safety management and loss of quality communication between process operations 
and maintenance teams (Qi et al. 2012). Companies undertaking this practice lack placing 
controls on the competency, knowledge, and quality of work procedures followed by 
subcontractor employees. Therefore, maintenance integrity of the process would be ruined.     
  To summarize, Figure 2 is adapted from Schneider (2014), and represents a visual map 
for the PSM program in the process industry according to the Plan- Do- Check- Act approach, 
where the different elements of the PSM program and the discussed PSM issues in the sector are 
highlighted. Steps in orange represent the areas where the sector faces issues. The orange dashed 
arrow is a gap in reporting between companies and process designers. 
   At the planning phase, process companies face problems with the organizational safety 
culture, which affect the overall PSM program. Influenced by industry and market, the 
organizational culture of process companies is still behind in terms of internal communication, 
employee participation in PSM, and most importantly the management attitude that encourages 
the tradeoff between production and process safety. It is believed that both functional and 
maintenance integrity are dependent on the human integrity which is in turn influenced by the 
organizational safety culture and training issues (i.e. erosion of human capital knowledge and 
experience, and lack of employee awareness about process risks).   
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  At the implementation stage, maintenance integrity is mainly affected by the outsourcing 
of maintenance activities to third-party companies, which engenders communication issues 
between the subcontractor and process employees. With regard to operational integrity, it is 
mostly compromised by the business mindset of management that pushes the process production 
up to the operational limits in an environment where the human component is not fully 
competent to operate complicated processes.   
  In terms of PSM performance measurement, companies in the process sector started to 
adopt PSM metrics along with personal safety ones. However, most companies still rely heavily 
on lagging metrics and need to move forward by setting additional PSM leading metrics. 
Furthermore, near misses are not tracked and analyzed by most of the companies, although they 
can be predictors of potential process incidents.        
    In the checking and corrective action phase, the lack of reporting of process safety 
experiences (i.e. operational issues, process safety incidents and near misses, etc.) to process 
designers, in order to continuously improve the inherent safety design practices is emphasized. 
The missing input from process designers would contribute to the PSM program through the 
enhancement of the functional integrity of processes, thus achieving the asset integrity goal.   
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Figure 2.  PSM program map in the process industry (Adapted from Schneider 2014) 
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In conclusion, this chapter outlined the characteristics of a quality PSM program and 
current PSM issues in the process industry. The sector faces safety culture and organizational 
issues along with unprecedented challenges related to the changes in technology and industry. 
Finally, a PSM program map was presented to illustrate the discussed issues in the sector.  
The next chapter will introduce the research methodology followed in this study to 
collect data, and will set the stage for the fourth chapter, where the research results are presented 
and discussed.       
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 This work aims to evaluate the integration of PSM program with the overall EHS 
management system of Sonatrach through the evaluation of Sonatrach’s PSM program 
effectiveness and a comparison of the current PSM program with the state of PSM within the 
overall processing sector internationally. To conduct this research, a mixed research method that 
consisted of quantitative and qualitative research tools, was followed. This chapter outlines the 
data collection procedure, research participants, and data analysis approach. 
3.1 Research design 
The research on the data about the Algerian oil and gas sector showed that there is little 
data about PSM in the sector. Therefore, an explanatory sequential mixed method was selected. 
This type of approaches is suitable for situations where there is a little or no data about the 
research subject. An explanatory sequential mixed method is a type of mixed research methods 
that starts with quantitative data collection and analysis, and followed up with qualitative data 
collection and interpretation. While the quantitative method helps in understanding the extent of 
existence or implementation of research variables, the qualitative method provides clarifications 
about the collected data from the quantitative method. Creswell (2013) explained that, “the 
overall intent of this design is to have the qualitative data explain in more detail the initial 
quantitative results.” For this research a survey tool was designed to collect quantitative data, and 
one-to-one interviews were conducted to collect qualitative data that builds on the results of the 
survey. 
3.1.1 Survey 
   An online survey was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of a PSM program based on 
the characteristics of a quality PSM program that were discussed in Chapter 2. Each 
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characteristic was associated with a set of indicators that reflect the extent of implementation of 
the relevant characteristic in a PSM program. Each indicator had in turn a metric or metrics to 
allow its measurement. The survey questions were crafted to allow the collection of quantitative 
data from participants, which will allow capturing the metrics of each indicator. Appendix 1 of 
this research presents the survey questions that were sent to the participants.    
3.1.2 Interviews 
 One-to-one interviews were held with EHS specialists working for Sonatrach. Interview 
questions, which are outlined in Appendix 2, were open-ended, and aimed to obtain further 
details and explanation about the survey results. The collected responses were transcribed and 
analyzed to identify constructs about PSM and EHS management at Sonatrach.    
3.2 Research Participants 
3.2.1 Survey 
 After designing the survey tool and translating it into French, a call for participation in 
the survey was sent to twenty-two EHS specialists working at different facilities of Sonatrach. 
Each facility was represented with one participant. The participants hold positions at different 
levels of the EHS department (e.g., technicians, engineers, supervisors, etc.) with key roles in 
PSM at their respective facilities, and all have more than three years of professional experience. 
To ensure the anonymity of participants, survey questions asked only for general information 
that identifies their facility in terms of main product, the headcount, and the yearly throughput. 
Facilities were identified in this work with letters and a brief description of processing activities 
and the region where the facility is located.  
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3.2.2 Interviews 
One-to-one interviews were conducted with EHS professionals working at different 
facilities and levels of the organization. Figure 3 shows the location of these facilities on the map 
of Algeria. Interviewees were selected based on their experience, which exceeds five years, and 
all have direct duties related to the PSM in their respective facilities. Interviewees were: 
• An EHS principal inspector working at the Unit and Engineering Service at the divisional 
level of the region of Hassi Messaoud. This service plays a coordinating and supervising 
role in all the facilities in the region. 
•  An EHS engineer working at the Unit and Engineering Service at the divisional level of 
the region of Hassi Messaoud.  
• An EHS engineer working at the Joint Venture (i.e. Sonatrach, British Petroleum, and 
Statoil) facility in In Aminas. 
• An EHS inspector working at a refinery in Skikda. 
• An EHS technician in the prevention section at a crude oil facility in the region of Hassi 
Messaoud. 
• An EHS technician in the intervention section at a gas facility in the region of Hassi 
R’mel. 
It is believed that this interview set comprises the major actors in PSM at Sonatrach.  
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Figure 3. The location of Sonatrach facilities on the map of Algeria 
 
To ensure the anonymity of the participants, pseudonyms were used throughout this work 
because some of the interviewees fear the reaction of the top management in case they are 
identified. In view of the number of facilities in the region and the headcount of EHS specialists 
holding the same titles at the different regions, it is believed that the above details about the 
participants would not jeopardize their anonymity.  
Interviews were focused on the PSM and EHS management in Sonatrach facilities in the region 
of Hassi Messaoud mainly because: 
1- It is the oldest and one of the largest oil and gas fields in Algeria with 1500 oil and gas 
wells by the end of 2014. 
2- There is a significant number of facilities in place (3 refineries, 4 processing facilities, 
7 satellite units, and 2 stations of water injection), and 
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3- It has a plurality of final products with PSM requirements (oil, gas, condensate, and 
other oil and gas derivatives).  
In conclusion, the research methodology followed in this work was the explanatory 
mixed method that facilitated the collection of quality data from different location and levels of 
Sonatrach. It helped in understanding the current status of PSM program and EHS management 
system of the company via an online survey and interviews held with EHS specialists working 
mainly in one of the largest and most important oil and gas fields in Algeria.      
The next chapter will present the results of the online survey and interviews, followed by a 
discussion about PSM and EHS management in Sonatrach.           
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Chapter 4: Results and Discussion 
   In the previous chapter, the research methodology used to collect data was outlined. It 
consisted of a survey followed by interviews with EHS specialists working for Sonatrach. 
Sonatrach was selected because of its important production capacities and the high number of 
process plants it owns and runs in Algeria. Furthermore, it was the largest oil and gas producer in 
Algeria and Africa and the third international exporter of liquefied petroleum gas and the fifth 
international exporter of gas in 2013 with a turnover of more than 63 billion USD (Sonatrach 
2015). In this chapter, the results of data collection will be presented and discussed. 
4.1 Survey Results: 
The preliminary analysis of survey results showed that ten out of twenty-two subjects had 
participated in the survey, which represented a participation rate of 45%. After the elimination of 
incomplete responses, four responses which represented four different facilities were taken. 
Table 2 outlines the description of facilities considered in this work: 
Facility Main Product Annual Throughput Headcount Nature of Activity 
Facility A Gas 108,000 m3 1,500 Gas production 
Facility B Oil 30,000,000 m3 57 Crude oil compression 
Facility C Gas 21,900,000,000 m3 42 Gas compression 
Facility D Oil derivates 16.5 million tons 1,500 Crude oil refining 
Table 2. Description of facilities considered in the analysis 
The four facilities considered in this work showed some similarities in terms of processes 
involved in their activities, thus the nature of potential risks. The production and compression of 
important volumes of crude oil or gas require operating big-size exchangers, compressors, 
turbines, storage tanks, etc. under high temperatures and pressures. These types of operations are 
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hazardous and present high risks like fire, explosion, pressure, and chemical risks due to the 
number of employees exposed to the hazards and the nature and the quantities of processed 
materials (i.e. flammable, corrosive, and toxic). Therefore, process safety would be the core 
focus of management in the facilities.   
Facility A and facility D would be considered large plants with intensive production of 
natural gas and processing of crude oil, but they differed in their annual throughput due to the 
difference in the markets of the final products from each facility. Natural gas from facility A is 
transported to another collecting station in the region of Hassi R’mel in order to be combined 
with the product of similar facilities before its exportation to Italy, Spain, and export terminals. 
However, facility D is the largest refinery in the country, and it fulfills the national demand on 
oil derivatives like kerosene, benzene, plastics, etc. and an important percentage of its product is 
also exported.  
Meanwhile, facility B and facility C represented two small remote plants where oil and 
gas are collected from wells or other large plants, then compressed and transported through 
pipelines to other locations. This type of activity translates the high annual throughput of each of 
those facilities, with limited headcount for operating and monitoring purposes only.     
The responses of participants to the survey questions were clustered in sections and are 
presented below in tables. Due to the lack of data, some metrics without input by all the facilities 
were not presented individually. Other metrics with singular input were discussed. This 
shortcoming, along with the small size of the sample, would influence the accuracy of analysis 
and prevent performing further statistical analysis. However, it will still be possible to draw 
some observations from the available data.  
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4.1.1 PSM Performance measurement  
The two metrics considered for PSM performance measurement in Table 3 would give an 
idea about the importance of PSM performance measurement for Sonatrach’s top management. 
Interest in process safety has to start first with adopting PSM performance metrics, then 
capturing them in a timely manner.  
The questions of this section were provided in section 2 of the survey: process safety 
management indicators (See Appendix 1). For the percentage of PSM-related metrics, questions 
were about the number of EHS metrics which are PSM-related and the overall number of EHS 
metrics adopted at each facility. The second metric about the deadline of reporting PSM-related 
metrics aimed to evaluate the delays in capturing PSM metric beyond the scheduled timeframe.  
Facility Metric Percentage of PSM-related metrics Deadline of reporting PSM-related metrics 
A 34 % More than two weeks but less than a month 
B 0 % /* 
C 0 % /* 
D 0 % /* 
(*) data was not provided by the participants. 
Table 3. Survey results about PSM Performance measurement 
Except for facility A where an important number of PSM indicators were considered, 
facilities B, C, and D did not adopt any PSM performance indicators as part of the overall EHS 
indicators. This finding led to look for further details about the quality of PSM performance 
measurement in Sonatrach facilities. For the delays in capturing PSM metrics, it was obviously 
not possible to provide such data by the participants since no PSM indicators were in place.    
4.1.2- Integration with EHS management system:  
The three metrics in Table 4 were among others included in the survey that aimed to 
evaluate the extent of integration of PSM activities with the overall EHS activities like audits, 
training, risk assessments, job definition, etc. The data provided in Table 4 about the percentage 
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of EHS training hours spent on PSM were based on the responses on questions of section 7 of the 
survey about the total hours spent per year for each employee in overall EHS training and on 
EHS training related to PSM. Meanwhile the percentage of employees with PSM roles defined in 
their job description was calculated based on the answers on a question in section 4 of the survey 
about the number employees who have PSM roles in their job description and the last question of 
section 1 about the headcount of operating employees at each facility. For the last metric in 
Table 4 about the percentage of process risk assessments reviews completion per year, the 
percentage was calculated based on the answers on section 9 of the survey about the total number 
of process risk assessment reviews scheduled per year, and the number of process risks 
assessment performed per year. 
Facility 
Metric 
Percentage of EHS 
training hours spent 
on PSM 
Percentage of employees with 
PSM roles defined in their job 
description 
Percentage of process risk 
assessments reviews 
completion per year 
A 50 % 25 % 23% 
B 15 % 62 % /* 
C 10 % 60 % /* 
D 25 % 35 % /* 
(*) data was not provided by the participants. 
Table 4. Survey results about the PSM program integration with the EHS management system 
The above data revealed a strong negative correlation between the size of the facilities 
and the integration of PSM roles in job descriptions (r=-0.97). In addition, there was a strong 
negative correlation between the integration of PSM roles in job descriptions and the integration 
of PSM training in the overall training programs (r=-0.91). In other words, although facilities B, 
C, and D had a significant number of their employees in charge of process safety roles as part of 
their jobs, employees would have spent less time in PSM training compared to the overall 
training hours. This would infer that the management of Sonatrach had less focus on PSM 
training, although this element is among the main pillars of a quality PSM program. Data for the 
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completion of process risk assessment reviews was not available for facilities B, C, and D. For 
facility A, a low rate of completion was reported (23 %).   
4.1.3- Training and competency:  
The metrics of this section were presented to evaluate the performance of Sonatrach in 
terms of PSM training and competency of personnel mainly in terms of: the availability of 
resources for training, the effectiveness of training, and the effectiveness of competency 
evaluation programs. However, only the two latter measures could be reported in Table 5. 
Answers on the first two questions of section 7 of the survey allowed the calculation of the rate 
of competency assessment completion based on the number of total employees who completed 
their competency evaluation on process operations and the rate of PSM training completion 
among employees from the total number of employees who completed their PSM training in 
each facility. 
Facility Metric Rate of competency assessment completion Rate of PSM training completion 
A 20 % 15 % 
B 9 % 48 % 
C 0 % 5 % 
D 60 % 70 % 
Table 5 Survey results about training and competency 
The data in Table 5 shows a strong positive correlation between the size of the facilities 
in terms of headcount and the completion rate of employees’ competency (r=0.77), and a 
moderate positive correlation between the training effectiveness and the size of facilities 
(r=0.31). This result may imply that large plants get more access to resources to train their 
employees compared to small ones even though they belong to the same company. Nevertheless, 
this conclusion would not be confirmed unless one analyzes further the training process and the 
organizational structure of the company. 
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4.1.4- Document management system:  
Documentation is an important part of the PSM program. For example and besides being 
an attribute of an effective PSM program, the U.S PSM regulations and standards like OSHA 
PSM 29 CFR 1910.119 requires the plant owner to develop, revise, and retain written process 
safety information and operating procedures, and make them available for employees and 
regulatory authorities. Therefore, the metrics of this section aimed to measure the performance of 
Sonatrach in terms of process documents control (i.e. in term of accuracy, completeness, storage, 
and retrieval of records), however answers on four metrics only were provided by the four 
facilities and reported in Table 6.  
For the metrics of Table 6 on records control that were based on the previous year audit 
findings, they were captured from responses on the questions of section 10 of the survey about 
the total number of audit findings on inaccurate records, incomplete records, inability to retrieve 
records, improper storage of records, and the total number of audit findings that were raised in 
the previous year. Whereas, the first question of section 3 of the survey asked the participants to 
estimate the percentage of obsolete documents in use in their respective facilities. Their 
responses were reported under the obsolete documents in use metric in Table 6. The frequency of 
procedures review/update metric represented the responses on the second and last question of 
section 3 of the survey about the process safety documents management where the participants 
estimated the delays in reviewing or updating process operating procedures in each facility based 
on the estimation of participants.  
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Metric Facility A B C D 
Audit findings about inaccurate 
or incomplete records 3 % 0 % 0 % 
/* 
Obsolete documents in use 21-40 % 1-20 % 1-20 % /* 
Frequency of procedures 
review/update 
Delay of a month or 
more but less than a 
quarter 
Delay of a 
semester or 
more 
Delay of a 
semester or 
more 
No 
delay 
Audits findings about inability 
or delays in retrieving records 10 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
Audits findings about improper 
storage of records 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
(*) data was not provided by the participants. 
Table 6. Survey results about document management system 
 Audits on EHS management system conducted in the four facilities did not raise almost 
any findings about document management. Except facilities A and D where procedures were 
reviewed or updated in a timely manner, facilities B and C showed long delays in reviewing the 
operating procedures with moderate percentage of obsolete documents in use. In view of the 
importance of documentation for PSM, questions about the efficiency of the document 
management system in these two facilities (B and C) should be raised.      
4.1.5 Top management commitment 
Top management commitment was one of the areas of focus in this survey as it would 
inform about the overall safety culture in the company, thus the EHS management system and 
PSM. Unfortunately, only one metric about the attendance of top management to the 
management review meetings was reported from facility A. Table 7 presents the survey results 
about management commitment to PSM in the four facilities. 
The questions in section 5 of the survey about the total number of management meetings 
held at each facility and on the number of those meetings attended by top management were used 
to capture the top management attendance in management review metric reported in Table 7. 
Furthermore, the respondents answered the last question of section 5 through the estimation of 
51 
 
the average response time on process safety suggestions from their reception till their resolution, 
as mentioned in Table 7 under the average response time to the resolution of process safety 
suggestion metric. For the last metric in Table 7, it was captured using answers on two questions 
of section 4 of the survey about the total number of employees’ suggestions about PSM 
submitted every year, and the number of accepted suggestions by the top management of each 
facility.     
Metric 
Facility 
A B C D 
Top management attendance in 
management review meetings 100 % /
* /* /* 
Average response time to the 
resolution of process safety 
suggestion (CCPS 2009) 
Less than 
a week 
Less than 
a week 
More than two 
weeks but less 
than a month 
Less than a 
week 
Percentage of accepted employees’ 
suggestions (CCPS 2009) 35 % 67 % 80 % 72 % 
(*) data was not provided by the participants. 
Table 7. Survey results about top management commitment 
 The collected data in Table 7 did not help to draw any conclusions about the attendance 
of top management to the management review meetings in facilities B, C, and D. However, it is 
assumed that top management was committed to participating in those meetings and opening 
communication channels between the top and lower levels of the company, in view of their 
positive performance with regard to the resolution of employees’ suggestions about process 
safety. The average response time to those suggestions did not exceed one week in facilities A, 
B, and D, and was less than a month in facility C.  
4.1.6 Stakeholder engagement, and communication 
Internal and external stakeholders’ engagement in PSM and communication are 
interrelated elements that are crucial for the success of any PSM program. In the context of this 
work, internal stakeholders for the four facilities are the employees and subcontractors, and 
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external stakeholders are mainly the regulatory authorities, local community, insurance 
providers, and clients. Therefore, the metrics were about the evaluation of employees’ 
participation in PSM activities, and about the evaluation of the legal stance of facilities as a 
measure of the involvement of regulatory authorities in the PSM. With regard to local 
community outreach, metrics were about the effectiveness of communication means and events 
between facilities and communities in surrounding areas and awareness of these communities 
about the nature of process hazards they are exposed to. Table 8 summarizes the reported results 
from the four facilities. For the first metric about percentage of operating employees involved in 
PHA, investigation, and procedures development or review, it was captured from the responses 
on the questions of section 4 of the survey about the number of employees involved annually in 
process hazard analysis, accident investigation teams, the development of operating procedures, 
and in the review of operating procedures. Concerning the second metric about the percentage of 
reduction in the number of citations from the Algerian regulatory institutions about PSM 
nonconformance, the participants answered two questions of section 12 of the survey about legal 
compliance that were about the number of citations received from regulatory institutions this 
year and in the last year. The last metric in Table 8 reported the answers of participants on the 
eighth question of section 6 of the survey: community outreach and communication.        
Metric 
Facility 
A B C D 
Percentage of operating employees involved in PHA, 
investigation, and procedures development or review. 45 % 42 % 30 % 40 % 
Percentage of reduction in the number of citations 
from the Algerian regulatory institutions about PSM 
nonconformance.  
40 % 0 % /* 0 % 
Frequency of updating communication plan /* Once per year /
* Once per year 
(*) data was not provided by the participants. 
Table 8. Survey results about stakeholder engagement, and communication 
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The data showed high rates of employees’ involvement in PSM activities in all the 
facilities. This performance may be linked to the PSM training completion in each facility, as 
there was a moderate positive correlation between the PSM training completion and the 
employees involvement in PSM activities (r=0.384). But other concerns arise from the collected 
data, as the employees’ engagement in PSM activities did not correlate with the number of 
employees with PSM roles. In fact, there was a strong negative correlation between these two 
variables (r=-0.598). Therefore, further details about employees’ engagement in PSM are needed 
to answer these concerns. Moreover, data about the law enforcement actions against these 
facilities would be helpful to understand their legal stance over the last five years. However, the 
collected data did not provide much insight in this area. Finally, and with regard to community 
outreach, facilities B and D reported that an update of their communication plan takes place once 
per year. This timeframe would imply the existence of open communication channels with local 
communities. The unavailability of data for facilities A and C is due to their location: both of 
them reported that they are located in remote areas where no local community is surrounding 
them.       
4.1.7- Emergency Preparedness /Early warning/detection and anticipation:  
The type of hazards associated with the activities in the oil and gas sector necessitates a 
permanent preparedness to cope with any hazardous deviation in process operations. This feature 
is also related to the awareness of PSM program status (including process mechanical integrity), 
as the anticipation and detection of hazardous situations require a permanent awareness of 
process status. Metrics were about the effectiveness and efficiency of drills and simulations, 
maintenance effectiveness, and emergency response training. The reported results are presented 
in Table 9.   
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The percentage of emergency response plan (ERP) training completion among employees 
metric in Table 9 was calculated from the answers of participants on the last question of section 
7 of the survey number of employees who have been trained on ERPs. The capture of the 
percentage of drills/ simulations completion metric was done based on the responses on the 
questions of section 15 of the survey about the total number of drills/simulation scheduled and 
performed per year. For the percentage of maintenance tasks/ inspections completion, the 
answers on the questions of section 13 of the survey about the number of process maintenance 
tasks scheduled and performed per year allowed capturing this metric.   
Facility 
Metric 
Percentage of ERP 
training completion 
Percentage of drills/ 
simulations completion   
Percentage of maintenance 
tasks/ inspections completion 
A 15 % 100 % 90 % 
B 48 % 100 % 95 % 
C 30 % 100 % 92 % 
D 70 % 100 % 90 % 
Table 9. Survey results about preparedness / early warning/ detection and anticipation 
The data presents a strong positive correlation between the size of facilities and the 
emergency response plans training completion (r=0.726). Furthermore, all the facilities reported 
a rate of drills completion of 100% and a percentage over 90% in terms of maintenance 
effectiveness. The data would suggest that the four facilities paid special attention to their 
preparedness for emergency situations through training, drills, and timely process maintenance 
activities. This observation would be interpreted by the importance given by Sonatrach to the 
continuity of process operation and production of oil, gas, and oil derivatives in general, 
knowing that oil and gas production is the main source of income for the country. 
4.1.8- Flexibility:  
 Flexibility is one of the features of resilient organizations or processes. It measures the 
capacity to handle external perturbations or deviations from operating procedures that can lead to 
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hazardous situations. Table 10 shows the results of the organizational resiliency questions 
(section 11) of the survey. The participants were requested to rate the ability of their respective 
facilities to detect, adapt to, and react to external perturbations or deviations.   
Facility 
Metric 
Facility’s ability to detect 
perturbation 
Facility’s ability to adapt 
perturbations 
Facility’s ability to react 
perturbations 
A 1-20 % 1-20 % 1-20 % 
B 21-40 % 21-40 % 21-40 % 
C 1-20 % 1-20 % 1-20 % 
D 41-60 % 41-60 % 41-60 % 
Table 10 Survey results about the flexibility of PSM 
All of the four participants estimated that their facilities had low resiliency levels, and 
none of them provided a definition of organizational resilience as it is perceived by their 
management. Thus, concerns would arise about the ability of these facilities to detect, adapt to, 
or react to external perturbations.  
4.1.9 Awareness of system status  
 Awareness of system or process status can be achieved through some PSM activities like 
audits, inspections, and preventive maintenance. The metrics selected for the auditing, 
inspection, or maintenance activities would inform about the effectiveness and efficiency of 
these elements in keeping the management aware of the status of processes and the performance 
of the PSM program.  
The questions of section 10 of the survey on the total number of planned and performed 
audits and the number of raised and closed audit findings facilitated capturing of both the 
percentage of audits completion and the audit findings closure metrics presented in Table 11. 
The percentage of maintenance tasks on process that failed to reveal failures was reported from 
the last question of section 13 about the number of maintenance tasks that did not discover 
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failures on process equipment compared to the total number of performed process maintenance 
tasks that was presented in the precedent question in the same section.  
Facility 
Metric 
Percentage of audits 
completion 
Percentage of audit 
findings closure  
Percentage of maintenance tasks on  
process that failed to reveal failures 
A 100 % /* 2 % 
B 100 % 100 % /* 
C 100 % 65 % /* 
D 100 % 70 % /* 
(*) data was not provided by the participants. 
Table 11. Survey results about the awareness of system status 
Table 11 introduces the participants’ responses, which were only on the questions related 
to PSM auditing and maintenance activities. Facilities reported positive performance in regard to 
audits effectiveness and completion. However, additional explanations are deemed necessary 
about the nature of conducted audits (i.e. internal, external) and their frequency, before drawing 
any conclusions about the auditing activity and the awareness of the PSM program status in 
general. Furthermore, facility A reported high maintenance efficiency, as only 2% of 
maintenance tasks failed to discover failures in their processes. The rest of the facilities (B, C, 
and D) did not provide any response about this metric.  
Due to the small size of the sample, and need for further explanation and confirmation of 
findings such as ongoing EHS programs made earlier, six interviews were conducted with EHS 
specialists working for the same company, Sonatrach, but at different locations and levels. These 
interviews aimed to gain a better understanding about PSM performance at Sonatrach. The 
following section will discuss the interview themes drawn from the analysis of transcribed 
interviews. 
4. 2 Interview Results: 
The interviewees provided detailed information and clarifications about the PSM 
program of Sonatrach and how it is integrated with the overall EHS management system. The 
57 
 
analysis of interview transcripts allowed for the conclusion of some common themes among the 
majority of facilities, which are presented underneath in detail.  
• PSM performance measurement 
The interviewees from facilities D, E, F, and H asserted that their facilities adopted only 
three lagging health and safety metrics for the measurement of EHS performance, and no process 
safety indicators were taken into account. The lagging metrics are captured at the end of each 
month and sent to the corporate office in Algiers. In this context, Mr. Ali (EHS engineer at 
facility E) stated, “Every month, we report the EHS statistics and metrics of our plant to the EHS 
department at the corporate level at Algiers. We capture three indicators which are the incident 
frequency rate, the incident severity rate, and the number of accidents.” Concerning the 
communication of these metrics within the plant, he added: “At the end of the year, we 
communicate all those indicators and other statistics to all the employees via posters and 
announcements at workplaces, commons, and residential blocks.” Moreover, the interviewees 
raised one more idea about EHS and PSM performance measurement. They confirmed that the 
majority of employees do not know what are the EHS objectives or targets of the company. This 
situation would impede Sonatrach’s ability to improve its EHS performance in the future.         
On the other side at facility A, PSM leading and lagging indicators like the rate of 
inspection completion, the number of near misses, and the rate of completion of technical audits 
were adopted as part of the overall EHS indicators. The EHS department communicates them on 
a monthly basis to all the employees working at the facility. “We consider the involvement of 
employees in achieving EHS objectives as a goal,” explained Mr. Ismail (EHS engineer at 
facility A).   
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•  Integration of PSM with the overall safety management system 
All the interviewees at all sites highlighted the integration of PSM with the EHS 
management system of the company. Several departments are involved in PSM as an integrated 
part of their function such as exploitation, methods, maintenance, and EHS departments. 
Furthermore, PSM activities like process inspections, maintenance, and audits are managed 
concurrently with other EHS activities and programs. An example of this integration would be 
the internal and external EHS audits carried out at each facility. These audits cover their 
technical aspects, process integrity, and safety in addition to the other aspects of the EHS 
management system. Mr. Ianis (an EHS inspector at facility D) added, “Usually when the 
external auditors of certifying bodies come to perform a follow-up audit at our facility, they audit 
every single aspect of processes as part of the health and safety management system in place like 
personal training on PSM, maintenance efficiency and performance, equipment integrity and 
safety systems of processes, etc. They reveal between 30% and 35% of findings about PSM out 
of the total findings every year.”  
• Training, competency, and continuous learning 
Since all the facilities belong to the same public-owned group, Sonatrach, they follow the 
same procedure for the management of employee training. All the employees in charge of 
operating processes receive training on process operation and maintenance at the Algerian 
Petroleum Institute, a training institution that is part of the Group Sonatrach. However, a limited 
number of them get trained every year on process safety subjects like process hazard 
identification, and risk assessment. Lack of training for EHS staff was also highlighted by most 
of the interviewees. “Many EHS personnel working at intervention sections are not trained on 
the operation of sophisticated firefighting equipment, which were purchased recently by the 
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company,” explained Mr. Farid (EHS intervention technician at facility G). With regard to 
competency assessment of operating employees, all the interviewees confirmed the existence of 
a system in place for the periodic assessment of skills and knowledge of operating employees.  
Our interviews revealed, however, significant deficiencies in the management of lessons 
learned from process incidents and/or safety drills and simulations. The majority of facilities do 
not share lessons learned from incidents that happened on their premises, as they fear the top 
management reaction. Mr. Ahmed (EHS prevention technician at facility F) said, “Whenever an 
incident occurs, the plant director reminds us not to send any safety alerts to the regional office 
or corporate offices to avoid further problems and questions from officers at the middle and top 
level of the company. So, no one knows about many incidents that took place in our plant except 
our employees.” In addition, many incidents are not subject to full investigation as per the 
provisions of an internal procedure. According to this procedure, incidents have to be fully 
investigated only if the involved employee is given a work leave for 21 days or more. Otherwise, 
a simple report that explains the incident is prepared and forwarded to the upper level of the EHS 
function.   
Concerning the lessons learned from drills, Mr. Ianis (EHS inspector at facility D) stated, 
“We conduct between four and twelve drills and simulations per year about process accidents in 
our plant in coordination with the public firefighting department and other local authorities. At 
the end of each exercise, we draw recommendations for improvements in terms of tactics and 
logistics of intervention in case of accidents. But we have never shared them with other facilities 
with similar activities. It would be weird if someone among us suggests this, as no one is used to 
thinking about that. All what we care about is the safety of our plant.” Similar statements were 
shared by other interviewees who implicitly agreed on a weakness in this area. Mr. Ahmed (EHS 
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prevention technician at facility F) said, “Every year, the EHS department prepares a drills plan. 
Usually, the intervention section performs them but we never know what recommendations or 
concerns they have or even share them with other facilities. They think that this is an internal 
matter of the intervention section and our section (prevention one) has nothing to do with them.” 
Furthermore, all the interviewees noticed that since 2008, there has been a large wave of 
early retirement among the operating employees who typically accumulated more than thirty 
years of experience. This poorly managed shift in human resources resulted in a significant loss 
of knowledge and a failure to retain the necessary learning in the majority of facilities. Mr. Omar 
(EHS principal inspector at facility E), illustrated the effect of this loss in learning due personnel 
retirement on the EHS performance of the region: “Since five years, we started to notice an 
increase in the frequency of some incidents (like strained twists, injuries, etc.) among new 
employees when operating equipment or some devices that were not a source of frequent 
incidents before that. These incidents were due to the lack of experience, mentoring, and training 
of newly hired crews.”  
• Robust Documentation system 
A major problem in the control of documents and records related to process equipment 
and installations was raised by most of the interviewees in many facilities. For instance, Mr. 
Ahmed (EHS prevention technician at facility F) illustrated: “Whenever there are excavation 
works inside the plant, we become worried if the excavator would hit an underground pipe or 
cable because no department in our facility has the maps of the underground electric cables and 
pipes.” In addition, Mr. Ali (an EHS engineer at facility E) disclosed, “A few months ago, a 
maintenance team requested a permit from our department to calibrate a safety valve placed on 
an old pressurized vessel. They used to calibrate the valve to start off whenever the pressure 
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inside the vessel reaches 38 bars. Whereas, the operating pressure of the vessel is usually around 
29 bars, and the manufacturer specifications recommend calibrating the valve at 30 bars. For 
years no one knew at what pressure the valve should be set to start off, because all the technical 
documents of that installation and other equipment were lost.”  
One last point was raised in facility D about the use of technical documents and 
equipment manuals. Many references are not used properly because of the language barrier. 
Equipment manuals and technical documents are written in English, which is less common as 
other languages in Algeria.  
• Top management commitment and leadership 
Top management commitment and leadership is one of the prominent issues in many of 
the facilities. Except facilities A and F where managers carry out roundabouts on a weekly basis 
and show their commitment to safety, the interviewees from facilities D, E, and G assumed that 
their management is invisible and does not lead by example or open communication channels 
with employees about EHS issues. In these later facilities, managers perform inspections and 
roundabouts only when there is an incident or exceptional circumstances (e.g. complete process 
shutdown, startup of new process, etc.). Mr. Omar (an EHS principal inspector at facility E) 
reported the same situation in many facilities in the region, and assumed that the only 
commitment of top management would be found on the company EHS policy. However in 
practice, middle level managers and supervisors still have the old mindset and consider the EHS 
function as a barrier against achieving operational objectives and increased production. He 
added, “Our EHS performance will not know any improvement as long as we keep reporting to 
the operations function at the top level of the company, instead of assigning a senior officer 
responsible for EHS management.”  
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  Moreover, all the interviewees from facilities D, E, F, and G had no idea about the EHS 
management review meetings as they were never been held in their facilities or at the regional 
level. They assumed that these meetings would be held at the corporate level because of the 
centralized structure of EHS function at Sonatrach. Facility A was the exception, as it had its 
own EHS management system and organizational structure. So, management review meetings 
took place twice per year over the last decade.      
• Stakeholder engagement/communication 
With regard to internal stakeholders’ engagement in PSM, the interviewees from 
facilities E, F, and G noted that the employees’ involvement was limited to PSM incidents 
investigation as witnesses or as members of investigation teams. In addition, the same 
interviewees asserted the absence of a stop-work authority system or any formal system to 
communicate the employees’ suggestions about EHS concerns to their facility management. 
Furthermore, the employees of those facilities in addition to facility D do not participate actively 
in the development and/or revision of operating procedures; however, their suggestions are 
sometimes taken into account like in facility D. For facility A, the interviewee confirmed that the 
participation of employees in the PSM program is viewed as a sign of a healthy safety culture. 
Therefore goals are set for this purpose and metrics are adopted to track the facility’s 
performance in this area. 
External stakeholders for EHS management and PSM at Sonatrach are mainly clients; 
public authorities (like Labor Inspection Office, District Environmental Department, and District 
Security Commission); insurance providers; and any local communities surrounding the plants. 
All the interviewees in the five facilities (A, D, E, F, and G) confirmed that over the last five 
years, they had one inspection visit at the most by the District Security Commission or District 
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Environmental Department. For instance Mr. Omar (EHS principal inspector at facility E) said, 
“Over fifteen years of work here, I had never seen officials from any public authority inspecting 
our PSM or our compliance with EHS regulations.” This lack of law enforcement by public 
authorities weakened their engagement in PSM at all the plants of Sonatrach.  
For the communication with local communities, interviewees from facilities A, E, F, 
and G stated that there is no external communication plans or events with them. They said it is 
simply because our plants are located in remote areas in the desert or inside industrial zones 
away from cities, although these last may be affected in case a significant process incident 
happens.   
• Preparedness/early warning/detection and anticipation 
  All the interviewees asserted that emergency response plans exist at their facilities and 
are revised as needed. However concerning resources, they pointed out the limited number of 
employees in the intervention sections that are in charge of handling process mishaps when they 
occur. In facilities E, F, and G, the problem of physical ability of an important number of 
intervention employees was considered critical since they had become old and can no longer 
meet the physical demand of the position.   
  Furthermore, the interview participants confirmed that almost all the processes were 
equipped with sophisticated detection, emergency shutdown, and automatic firefighting systems, 
following the provisions of insurance providers. Periodic maintenance activities of processes are 
done by a third party on a timely manner at all the facilities. For facilities E, F, and G, process 
maintenance services are usually provided by a specialized unit of maintenance that belongs to 
Sonatrach as well. Whereas, some plants like facility D maintain contracts with the process 
manufacturer to secure the maintenance services for the purchased equipment.   
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• Flexibility 
  The interviewees in all the facilities assumed that their facilities would be able to detect 
and react to a security threat. Mr. Farid (EHS intervention technician at facility G) added, “As of 
the first quarter of 2013, the security personnel in our facility became armed all the time and 
supported with gendarmerie elements (a military institution in charge of police duties).Whereas 
in the past, few of them only were armed during night shifts only and there was no presence of 
any public security forces.” This would be explained with the strategic position of the oil and gas 
sector in Algeria, as it is the main source of income for the country. Therefore, the security of oil 
and gas plants would be one of the highest priorities for the Algerian government. However, the 
interviewees in facilities D, E, F, and G were not sure about the ability of processes and other 
installations to resist an industrial perturbation (blast, fire, etc.) occurring in a neighboring 
facility and going beyond its premises. In this context, Mr. Ahmed (EHS prevention technician at 
facility F) explained, “In the aftermath of the terrorist attack of Tiguentourine on January 16, 
2013 (discussed in the background section of Chapter 1), our security measures against any 
security threat were strengthened since a military troop was placed nearby our facility to secure 
all the facilities in the area. However, I do not think we have measures at our level to resist a 
thermal flow or an overpressure coming toward our processes and storage tanks, as a result of a 
fire or explosion in a nearby facility.”     
• Awareness of system status 
 In facilities D, E, F, and G, internal audits were conducted once or twice per year at the 
most by a team of EHS auditors from the corporate office at Algiers and the EHS department at 
the regional level, just before the external one became due. For facility A, audits were planned 
and conducted throughout the year before and after any external audits. The PSM findings in 
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facilities D, E, F, and G were about 30 to 45% of the overall EHS audit findings. This significant 
percentage of findings could be due to two main reasons: either the PSM program was 
disintegrated from the EHS management system or due to the quality of audits. Meanwhile, other 
PSM activities like process maintenance activities and inspections were carried out regularly. For 
the latter ones, they were included as part of the overall EHS inspections, which are performed 
on a bi-weekly basis.  
4.3 Discussion 
From the above results, facility A could be considered as an outlier compared to the other 
facilities included in this study, in view of the provided responses about PSM compared to the 
other facilities. It is argued that facility A enjoys a better safety culture than the rest of facilities 
that were the subject of the interviews.    
In addition to the PSM issues in the process industry, illustrated in Chapter 2, and based 
on the themes identified from interviews, Sonatrach found to be facing additional problems in 
several areas. 
The top management of Sonatrach shows a lack of commitment and leadership toward 
PSM and EHS management in general, although they engaged in a certification process to get 
ISO 14001 certification. The organizational structure of Sonatrach inhibits the EHS department 
from achieving its outcomes and limits its influence, as the EHS function is not reporting to a 
senior EHS officer at the top level of the company. Placing EHS function under the 
responsibility of production departments is a unique issue that was not reported by experts or 
researchers as a concurrent issue in the process sector. In addition, there was a negative 
perception about the commitment of top management toward EHS management. The interviews 
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revealed that top management commitment is announced only in the EHS policy of the company. 
However, the EHS function is always seen as a barrier for production and operations.   
The lack of commitment from top management is reflected also in the definition of goals 
and PSM indicators of performance. In addition to the complete reliance on lagging personal 
safety indicators as measures for process safety performance, the EHS department of Sonatrach 
did not set goals to manage its EHS systems, including the PSM program. In the same vein, top 
management did not set a minimum level of PSM performance for all their plants to maintain. 
Furthermore, Sonatrach lacks an effective system for the control of documents and records. 
Missing operating procedures, technical drawings, and documentation for most of the process 
equipment and installation is among the common issues within the organization. Although the 
survey results showed that audits did not raise any findings about records retrieval or accuracy, 
the scope of audits and quality of auditing process have to be reviewed to cope with this issue. 
Moreover and due to its poor safety culture, incidents and lessons learned from incidents were 
not being investigated properly and shared among the facilities of Sonatrach. Thus, it is believed 
that Sonatrach loses a crucial opportunity to learn new lessons and avoid the reoccurrence of 
similar incidents at the same facility since there is a deficiency in the incidents investigation 
system.     
 The aforementioned deficits in PSM had a direct repercussion on the engagement of 
some stakeholders in PSM. Sonatrach employees, who represent the main internal stakeholders 
for EHS management, are not involved in PSM activities like hazard identification, risk 
management, procedures development, etc., whereas, insurance providers are the main external 
stakeholders for EHS management that have a tangible influence on PSM through the 
prescription of process safety requirements and auditing plants. For the regulatory stance, the 
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company does not know where it stands in terms of compliance with EHS regulations and laws. 
The responsibility for this failure is shared between Sonatrach and regulatory enforcement 
authorities. These latter ones (regulatory enforcement authorities) exert only limited efforts to 
inspect public and private companies in many sectors to ensure legal compliance.  
On the other hand, it is believed that other companies in the sector would have limited 
influence on the safety culture of Sonatrach. This conclusion can be proven from the significant 
difference in maturity and performance of EHS management among Sonatrach facilities and 
other joint venture plants of Sonatrach with BP, Statoil, Total, etc. These joint venture plants are 
managed as per the international standards, but Sonatrach did not take advantage of these 
arrangements to improve the safety culture within its own facilities. This observation could be 
further analyzed in a future work to understand the drawbacks preventing Sonatrach from taking 
this opportunity.  
In terms of preparedness, early warning, detection, and anticipation, it was found that 
Sonatrach encounters the same issues as other companies in the sector internationally, in addition 
to experiencing a remarkable shortage in human resources for the intervention section at many 
plants. Most of the employees took retirement or are old and do not have the physical ability to 
continue to working in this section. 
Finally, and although they were performed in the majority of Sonatrach facilities, the 
planning of internal audits seems to be done from a reactive perspective. Internal audits are 
completed once per year just before the due date of the external audit. Furthermore, it is clear 
from the collected data that the auditing process lacked effectiveness. The findings revealed that 
Sonatrach had deficiencies in relation to PSM document control, whereas the survey data 
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affirmed that no findings related to the PSM documents completeness, recording, storage, or 
retrieval were raised in most of the facilities.   
 Moreover, many plants cannot secure the necessary spare parts for the maintenance of 
process installations. The reasons for this vary between financial, bureaucratic, and practical 
considerations. Most of the process equipment has been in service for thirty to forty years, and 
manufacturers have stopped producing spare parts for old models and the cost of spare parts is 
very high. Under these circumstances, troubleshooting became a norm in many facilities.   
In order to illustrate the findings of this research, Figure 4 which is adapted from 
Schneider (2014), represents the PSM program map of Sonatrach. This map illustrates PSM 
issues in the sector in addition to the identified issues in Sonatrach facilities. Steps in red 
represent the areas where the company faces issues. The red dashed arrows are gaps in reporting 
and communication within the organization or with external stakeholders. 
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Figure 4. The PSM program map of Sonatrach (adapted from Schneider 2014) 
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To conclude, this chapter discussed the data collection results, and analyzed the survey 
and interviews outcomes regarding PSM in Sonatrach facilities. The discussion of these results 
showed some unique issues at Sonatrach in addition to those reviewed in Chapter 2. Sonatrach 
encounters significant cultural issues that affect the performance of its current PSM program and 
its integration within the overall EHS management system. A map of the PSM program of 
Sonatrach is presented based on the findings of this work. The following chapter will conclude 
the work and recommend future extensions to this research.  
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Chapter 5: General Conclusions 
5.1 Research summary and recommendations 
The process sector has made significant progress in terms of PSM. Companies in the 
sector have become able to understand how process incidents manifest, and shifted to the 
proactive management of process hazards in order to prevent the occurrence of these incidents. 
This development in controlling process hazards has been the result of enhancements in the 
process design and advancements in science and engineering fields. Nevertheless, the sector 
failed to achieve full safety of processes and prevent the occurrence of incidents. Major 
unprecedented accidents are still hitting plants internationally, leading to severe human and 
material losses. These accidents are the result of a combination of cultural, organizational, and 
technical issues in the EHS management and PSM in particular. In this work, the most common 
issues related to the EHS management and PSM in the sector that were reported in literature over 
the last six years, were reviewed. Finally, a map of PSM program in the process industry was 
created, and reflects all the issues identified above.       
This work subscribes to the ongoing efforts to explore issues in PSM in developing 
countries, as the majority of studies concern facilities located in developed countries with little 
focus on companies in the process sector established in developing countries where the majority 
of high hazardous work occurs. Research focused on the effectiveness of PSM programs at 
Sonatrach, the Algerian oil and gas public company, which is the largest company in this sector 
in Africa. In view of its size, production capacities, and location, this company was considered as 
a typical one in Africa to conduct this research on it. 
The research methodology followed in this work consisted of a mixed method of 
quantitative and qualitative tools. An online survey was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of 
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the PSM program and its integration with the overall EHS management system. The 
questionnaire was then tested, and sent to twenty-two EHS specialists working in different 
facilities of Sonatrach, including its joint ventures with other international companies. The 
analysis of results, six weeks after launching the survey, showed a need for further development 
of responses by the EHS department of Sonatrach, due to the limited size of our sample and 
incompleteness of received responses. Subsequently, a set of interviews was held with other EHS 
specialists working for Sonatrach at different facilities and levels of the organization that showed 
additional issues that Sonatrach faces in terms EHS management and PSM, in addition to the 
ones the sector encounters internationally, as reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Conclusion 1: Lack of top management commitment, leadership, and communication 
Severe safety cultural issues in Sonatrach facilities were identified and related to lack of 
top management commitment, leadership, and communication. It is believed that Sonatrach’s 
safety culture represents an inattentive culture prevailing in the sector internationally that 
resulted from top management, and can have catastrophic impacts and implications. To address 
these issues, a thorough review and reform of the organizational safety culture should be the 
urgent task to complete before tackling other issues. Having the positive commitment of top 
management and leadership is the foundation for establishing a good safety culture. This will 
pave the way for redressing of the following issues in PSM or EHS management system. 
Conclusion 2: Absence of PSM performance measurement 
The findings present some PSM issues unique to Sonatrach like absence of PSM 
performance measurement, and ambiguous or nonexistent EHS goals for all the company. In 
addition, Sonatrach lacks an internal standard for an effective PSM that states the minimum PSM 
performance to be maintained by all the facilities and subsidiaries. This standard would help the 
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company establish for a continuous improvement in their PSM performance and prioritize areas 
of action at each facility. Sorting out these issues requires first a commitment by the top 
management toward prevention of incidents and injuries. Therefore, it is believed that these 
issues should be addressed after fixing the ones related to cultural issues. After that, EHS goals 
(including PSM ones) should be defined, and EHS and PSM leading and lagging indicators have 
to be established using audit results and previous EHS statistics. Benchmarking with competitors 
and other leading companies in the sector would facilitate the selection of performance indicators 
and areas of focus. 
Conclusion 3: Ineffective document management system   
This work revealed the ineffective control of process documents and records and a 
deficient incident investigation process. These issues cannot be fixed unless the previous ones 
are thoroughly investigated and properly addressed. However for the control of process 
documents, the resolution of this shortcoming requires a deep audit of the PSM program and 
EHS management system in general, in order to identify gaps in document management and 
bridge them. But before that, it would be efficient to take advantage of information technology 
tools and establish an internal online platform that links all the facilities together and serves as 
the host for all PSM documents. With regard to the incident investigation process, Sonatrach 
should establish a reporting system for near misses that allows the investigation of near misses 
and incidents.    
Conclusion 4: Deficiency in regulatory enforcement by public authorities 
Finally, findings have proven a significant deficiency in regulatory enforcement by public 
authorities. For this reason, Algerian authorities are strongly encouraged to update the existing 
laws and regulations related to occupational health and safety, and promulgate new regulations to 
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cover PSM in the process industry. These legal tenets ought to be enforced by competent 
institutions in order to ensure an acceptable level of safety performance in the process industry. 
Furthermore, it is recommended that competent institutions develop a matrix for societal risk 
assessment to be used as a guideline by companies in the process industry for the management of 
process risks, and land use planning of future plants. Indeed, Algeria like most developing 
countries, is still lagging in terms of EHS regulations that ensure the safety of people, and 
maintain the minimum level of process integrity performance at all the sites. Thus, leveraging the 
experience of developed countries in PSM and adapting it to the Algerian context would 
facilitate bridging this gap.  
It is worthwhile to note that these findings were only linked to facilities where Sonatrach 
is the only owner and operator of processes. Joint venture facilities with international oil and gas 
companies were the exception, and tend to follow international standards in terms of PSM.  
In general, the process industry needs to take further steps to acquire control of the 
emerging PSM issues. Among these actions, companies should establish an effective learning 
system that allows a harmonized flow of information about process experience among process 
users, designers, and other interested parties to prevent the reoccurrence of incidents, and 
enhance inherent process design practices. Furthermore, each company should adopt a 
succession plan for its human capital in order to retain minimum knowledge and expertise among 
employees and achieve a better human integrity. Finally, top management of companies in the 
sector are compelled to take further steps to integrate EHS management into decision making by 
considering the input from process risk analysis along with the financial and operational input 
when making decisions, and boost their commitment toward proper and robust PSM.  
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 5.2 Research limitations 
 As any academic work, this research has some limitations; in this case, this is due to the 
small size of the final sample considered for analysis. Furthermore, the incompleteness of survey 
responses prevented conducting further statistical analysis about the statistical significance of 
responses and uncertainties in participants’ answers. This incompleteness was due to the 
unavailability of data at the level of participants, who work for a company that faces internal 
communication challenges, and demonstrates fears of open communication. 
 Moreover, the translation of the survey from English to French may have caused a minor 
loss in the meaning of some terms, although the French version was also verified by another 
competent bilingual EHS specialist.  
 Finally and due to the unavailability of published data about PSM from Algerian 
authorities or Sonatrach, a challenge in corroborating and confirming some facts provided by 
interviewees with other external sources was faced. Therefore, this work considered only the 
most frequent issues in common among facilities, as they were reported by interviewees.      
5.3 Future work:     
 This work can be improved by considering a larger sample of facilities for analysis, and 
developing a composite indicator that allows comparisons between the current performance 
levels in the sector with the scored level of each facility. It is an important first step in measuring 
the effectiveness of PSM in non-first-world countries and provides insight into the challenges of 
appropriate PSM beyond policy.  
 Future research would investigate the huge difference in safety culture and EHS 
management among facilities and joint ventures with first-world partners, to explore the root 
causes for not adopting the same best practices about EHS management within all facilities. 
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Finally, conducting this research on a process company in another developing country would be 
another extension for this work. This extension would give insight into similarities in PSM in 
developing countries and an understanding of where they stand in terms of PSM compared to 
developed countries.                
 This work indicates the idea that policy creation on an international scale must be adapted 
and implemented locally, and that local context (culture) largely drives success in PSM. 
Therefore, a much more mature safety culture is the upcoming challenge for third-world 
countries to desire to achieve a better EHS and PSM performance in the process industry. 
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Appendix 1. Survey questions about PSM in Sonatrach  
1. General Information: 
This section helps us understand the context of your facility, and asks for general information that identifies it from other facilities. 
What is the main product of your facility?  Gas Oil Oil derivates 
What is the annual throughput of your facility?  
What is the operating budget of your facility?  
What is the total employee headcount of your facility?  
What is the headcount of operating employees? By 
“operating employees” we mean those who are at the 
lower level of the organization and have duties related 
to process activities?  
 
2. Process Safety Management Indicators: 
The questions of this section ask about adoption and capture of process safety management indicators within your facility. 
How many Environmental, Health and Safety indicators 
have your facility adopted last year?  
Among the overall Environmental, Health and Safety 
indicators, how many process safety management 
indicators have your facility adopted last year? 
 
How long is the average delay in capturing Process 
Safety Management indicators?  
A semester 
or more 
A quarter or more 
but less than 
semester 
A month or 
more but less 
than a quarter 
More than two 
weeks but less 
than a month 
Between a 
week and 
two weeks  
Less than a 
week  
No 
delays 
3. Process Safety Documents Management: 
The following section is about the management of process safety documents (forms, procedures, technical drawings, etc.) in terms of reviewing and update. 
How do you rate the percentage of obsolete documents 
in use out of the total number of documents? 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
How long is the average delay in procedures review?  A semester or more 
A quarter or more 
but less than 
semester 
A month or 
more but less 
than a quarter 
More than two 
weeks but less 
than a month 
Between a 
week and 
two weeks  
Less than a 
week  
No 
delays 
How long is the average delay in procedures update? A semester or more 
A quarter or more 
but less than 
semester 
A month or 
more but less 
than a quarter 
More than two 
weeks but less 
than a month 
Between a 
week and 
two weeks  
Less than a 
week  
No 
delays 
4. Employees Participation 
The following questions are about the involvement of employees in the management of process safety. We mean by “operating employees” those who are at 
the lower level of the organization and have duties related to process activities (operations and maintenance) 
How many employees have process safety management 
roles in their job description?  
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Is there a program for employees to communicate their 
suggestion about process safety matters to the facility 
management? 
Yes No 
If yes, how many suggestions on average 
submitted annually?  
How many suggestions on average accepted 
annually?  
How many operating employees are involved annually 
in process hazard analysis?  
How many operating employees are involved annually 
in accident investigation teams?  
How many operating employees are involved annually 
in the development of operating procedures?  
How many operating employees are involved annually 
in the review of operating procedures?  
5. Top Management Commitment: 
The questions below are about the commitment of top management of your facility toward process safety. By “Top management” we mean the senior officers 
who are responsible for managing the business and running the facility (including process activities) like Base manager, Operations manager, Production 
manager, etc.         
Does your facility have a plan for walk-rounds? Yes No 
If yes, how many walk-rounds are planned on 
average per year? 
 
How many walk-rounds are performed by the top 
management of your facility per year?  
 
How many management review meetings are held per 
year in your facility?  
How many management review meetings are attended 
by the top management of your facility?   
How do you rate the average response time on process 
safety suggestions from their reception till their 
resolution? 
A semester 
or more  
A quarter or 
more but less 
than semester 
A month or more 
but less than a 
quarter 
More than two 
weeks but less 
than a month 
Between a week 
and two weeks  
Less than a 
week 
6. Community Outreach and Communication: 
The following questions aim to assess the extent to which your facility communicates with the nearby community. Please note that if your answers on the 
first two questions are both “NO”, then you may skip this section.   
Is your facility located in an urban area?  Yes No 
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Is your facility located in a suburban area? Yes No 
If yes, does your facility have a plan for open 
meetings with the community? Yes No 
If yes, How many open meetings with the 
community are planned for the year? 
 
How many open meetings are actually held 
with the community each year? 
 
What is the average number of inquiries submitted to the 
top management of the facility per year? 
 
What is the average number of completed commitments 
toward the community?  
 
In the event of an accident, what is the total number of 
community members who would be potentially affected?  
What is the average number of community members 
who were trained on Emergency Response Plans by the 
company per year? 
 
What is the average number of community members 
who are aware of emergency response scenarios?  
Does your facility have a communication plan with the 
community?  Yes No 
If yes, what is the frequency of updating your 
facility communication plan? 
Once in more 
than three years   
Once in three 
years  Once every two years Once a year 
Less than once a 
year 
How long on average is the delay to respond on 
community inquiries comparing to the planned 
timeframes? 
Three months 
or more 
Two months or more 
but less than three 
months   
A month or 
more but less 
than two months 
More than two 
weeks but less 
than a month 
Two weeks or 
less 
No delays at 
all 
7. Training, Education, and Competency  
This section aims to get an idea about process safety training and competency of employees in your facility. 
Is there a system for employees’ competency assessment 
on process safety management in your facility?   Yes No 
If yes, how many employees have completed 
their competency assessment on process safety 
management?   
 
Does the training plan of your facility include training 
on process safety management? Yes No 
If yes, how many employees have completed 
training on process safety management?   
What are the total hours spent per year for each 
employee in: 
a. EHS training?  
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b. Process safety management training?   
What is the average budget allocated for the training of 
employees in your facility per year?  
How many employees have been trained on Emergency 
Response Plans?  
8. Continuous Learning 
The questions of this section are about sharing and implementation of learnt lessons (also called safety alerts) from process safety experiences (near misses, 
accidents) that happened in your facility, other company facilities, or in the industry.   
How many learnt lessons (Safety Alerts) shared by other 
companies with your facility per year?   
How many learnt lessons (Safety Alerts) 
recommendations from process safety experiences have 
been implemented per year in your facility? 
 
9. Risk Assessment and Process Safety Information, 
This section is about Risk Assessments performed for process activities and Process Safety Information. We mean by “Process Safety Information” a 
compilation of written information about “the hazards of the highly hazardous chemicals used or produced by the process, information on the technology of 
the process, and information on the equipment in the process.”(U.S OSHA, 2000)  
What is the total number of risk assessments on process 
activities conducted in your facility?  
Is there a procedure for reviewing risk assessments on 
process activities conducted in your facility? Yes No 
If yes, how many risk assessments on process 
activities reviewed per year in your facility?   
Does your facility have a plan for reviewing process 
safety information? Yes No 
If yes, how many process safety information 
reviews are planned in your facility per year?  
How many process safety information reviews 
conducted in your facility per year?  
10. Audits and Inspections: 
This section is about process safety management audits conducted in your facility. The questions are about audits planning and types of findings   
Does your facility conduct process safety management 
audits separately from the overall Environmental Health 
and Safety management system audit? 
Yes No 
If yes, how many process safety management 
audits are planned per year?  
How many process safety management audits  
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are completed per year?  
How many findings on process safety management per 
year have been raised?   
How many closed findings on process safety 
management per year?  
Are there any process safety audit findings that are 
repeating for two years in a row? Yes No 
If yes, how many process safety audit findings 
have repeated for two years in a row?  
 How many audit findings per year on: 
 a. delays in retrieving records?  
b. inability to retrieve records?  
c. improper storage of records?  
d. inaccurate records?  
e. incomplete records?  
11. Organizational Resilience: 
This section assesses the organizational resilience of your facility. In this context, We mean by “Organizational Resilience” the ability of an organization to 
detect, adapt, and react on a timely manner to an external disturbance that would affect process activities.  
How do you rate the ability of your facility to detect any 
external disturbances that would affect process 
activities? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
How do you rate the ability of your facility to react in 
timely manner to external disturbances affecting process 
activities? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
How do you rate the ability of your facility to adapt to 
external disturbances affecting process activities? 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
What is the definition of organizational resilience, as 
perceived in your facility? 
[Type your answer here] 
12. Legal Compliance  
This section aims to understand where your facility stands in terms of compliance with applicable regulations related to process activities.  
Do regulating agencies conduct periodic inspections 
about process activities in your facility? Yes No 
If yes, over the last five years, how many 
inspections related to process activities have 
been conducted by regulating agencies in your 
facility?   
 
 How many citations has your facility received about the 
process safety management from regulatory agencies in  
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last year?  
How many citations has your facility received about the 
process safety management from regulatory agencies 
this year? 
 
What is the average cost of fines from regulating 
agencies received by your facility for noncompliance 
with process safety management regulations over the last 
five years?   
 
What is the average cost of fines from regulating 
agencies received your facility for noncompliance with 
process safety management regulations last year?   
 
13. Process Maintenance Activities 
The questions of this section are about the planning and efficiency of process maintenance activities in your facility. 
Does your facility have a plan for preventive 
maintenance tasks on process equipment? Yes No 
If yes, what is the total number of planned 
preventive maintenance tasks on process 
equipment per year? 
 
How many preventive maintenance tasks on process 
equipment are completed per year?  
How many maintenance tasks that did not discover 
failures on process equipment?  
14. Safety Systems 
This section is about the function and periodic inspection of safety systems that monitor and protect the process. 
What is the average number of safety critical instruments 
that monitor process condition in your facility?  
Are there any safety critical instruments that failed to 
indicate process conditions last year? Yes No 
If yes, how many safety critical instruments that 
failed to indicate process conditions last year?   
How many safety systems activations (valves, reliefs, 
etc) were recorded last year due to equipment failures?    
How many safety systems activations (valves, reliefs, 
etc) were recorded resulting in complete shutdown of the 
process last year due to equipment failures?   
 
Does your facility conduct periodic test of process safety 
systems? Yes No 
If yes, how many process safety systems that 
did not function properly to the desired  
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performance standard when tested in the last 
periodic test? 
15. Safety Drills  
This is the last Section! The following questions are about drills planning and outcomes in your facility. 
How many safety drills were planned last year?   
How many drills were conducted last year?  
Does your facility review Emergency Response Plans 
after conducting drills? Yes No 
If yes, how many reviews have been performed 
last year resulting in changes on Emergency 
Response Plans?   
 
How many changes in Emergency Response Plans 
tactics have been introduced following the conducted 
drills in your facility last year? 
 
How many changes in Emergency Response Plans 
logistics have been introduced following the conducted 
drills in your facility last year? 
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Appendix 2. Interview questions 
1- PSM Performance Measurement: 
• How does your plant follow the performance of process safety management?  
• What type of indicators did your facility adopt for your PSM?  
• Are the employees of your plant aware of the existing indicators?  
• What is the frequency of sharing the reported indicators with the facility employees? 
2- Integration of PSM with EHS: 
• Besides the EHS specialists, who is else in your facility is responsible on PSM? 
• What is the scope of EHS audits in your facility?  
3- Training, Education, Competency, And Continuous Learning: 
• What type of PSM training do your employees and contractor employees receive as part 
of the overall EHS training?  
• How do you assess the competency of employees in terms of process operation and 
maintenance? 
• Do you share or receive any safety alerts from other facilities related to PSM? 
4- Document Management System: 
• Briefly describe the process of revising or updating operating procedures (who initiates 
the process, how it is prepared, tested, approved, and communicated?)  
• Are the employees ‘suggestions taken into account?  
• Do you think it takes a long time to complete the update or review of procedures? 
• Did you experience any incidents or recorded non conformances due to a documentation 
problem? 
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5- Top Management Commitment and Leadership: 
• Do your managers perform or participate in roundabouts in your facility?  
• How do your managers communicate with employees about process safety subjects? 
6- Stakeholder Engagement/ Communication: 
• What type of PSM-related activities are employees or their representatives involved?   
• How do you evaluate the status of your plant in terms of compliance with EHS laws and 
regulations? If not known, what is the frequency of inspections by regulatory institutions 
(inspections by labor inspection, department of environment, security committee of the 
District)?   
7- Preparedness /Early Warning/Detection And Anticipation: 
• Describe the drills plan and activities in your plant (who plans them, who participates, 
material means availability, learnt lessons are implemented and shared)? 
• How do you evaluate the ability of your processes to detect serious failures, malfunction, 
or abnormal conditions?  
• How do you evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of your process maintenance 
activities? 
8- Flexibility: 
• In case of external perturbation on your process, do you think your facility is able to 
detect, react, and adapt appropriately in a timely manner?   
9- Awareness of system status: 
• What are the PSM activities that keep you aware of the status of your process?  
 
 
